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LEAD ARTICLE
“NATURAL BORN CITIZEN”
THOMAS H. LEE*
Article II of the U.S. Constitution states that a person must be a “natural
born Citizen” to be eligible to be President. This Article surveys relevant evidence
and explains what the phrase likely meant when the Constitution was adopted
between 1787 and 1789. The phrase at the time encompassed three categories
of persons: (1) persons born within the United States; (2) persons born outside
of the United States to U.S. citizens in government service; and (3) persons born
outside of the United States to U.S. citizen fathers who had resided in the United
States but went abroad temporarily for a private purpose, like merchants who
traveled on business. This definition corresponded with contemporaneous
English law understandings of “natural born subjects,” the natural law
birthright principles of jus soli (the law of soil) and jus sanguinis (the law of
blood or parentage), and the law of nations—the key jurisprudential sources
consulted by Americans on matters of citizenship in the late eighteenth-century
world order. This novel interpretation of the original meaning of “natural born
Citizen” departs from the conventional wisdom that the phrase refers to a person
who is a citizen under the U.S. naturalization statutes in effect at the person’s
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birth, a view recently espoused by two former Solicitors General of the United
States, Paul Clement and Neal Katyal. My interpretation also differs from the
leading alternative view of the original meaning of the phrase, namely that it
refers to persons born in the United States or outside of the United States to U.S.
officials only. A brief conclusion explores the implications of the recovered
original meaning of “natural born Citizen” for presidential eligibility today.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Constitution provides: “No Person except a natural born
Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption
of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President.”1 This
Article offers a comprehensive account of the original meaning of
“natural born Citizen.” This is an important contribution for three
reasons. First, the U.S. Supreme Court has never decided what the
words mean, and the phrase’s original meaning is sure to loom large
in any future ruling, even for non-originalists.2 Nevertheless, intense
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
2. I do not mean to suggest that originalism is the only method of constitutional
interpretation or that it is the best method; my point is that the original meaning is
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prior scrutiny and scholarship has yielded no definitive answer to date,3
and this Article mines newly discovered evidence. Second, several
presidential candidates, including Barry Goldwater, George Romney,
and John McCain, faced allegations that they were not natural born
citizens.4 Accusations were also leveled against President Barack
Obama on the specious theory that he was born outside the United
States to a foreign father and a U.S. citizen mother.5 Most recently,
doubts were raised during the 2016 presidential primaries whether
Senator Ted Cruz, who was born in 1970 in Canada to a U.S. citizen
mother and a non-U.S. citizen father, was a natural born citizen.6 The
the starting point for any approach to constitutional interpretation. Nor is this Article
addressed to methodological debates within originalism itself, e.g., intent versus public
meaning. Rather, the aim is to provide an accurate and complete understanding of
what the words “natural born Citizen” in Article II likely meant between 1787 and 1789
when the Constitution was adopted.
3. Commentators have noted “speculation on the scope of the language,” its
“[d]angerous [a]mbiguity,” and referred to the Clause as an “[u]nresolved [e]nigma.”
JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42097, QUALIFICATIONS FOR PRESIDENT AND THE
“NATURAL BORN” CITIZENSHIP ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENT 1 (2016); see also Sarah Helene
Duggin & Mary Beth Collins, “Natural Born” in the USA: The Striking Unfairness and
Dangerous Ambiguity of the Constitution’s Presidential Qualifications Clause and Why We Need
to Fix It, 85 B.U. L. REV. 53, 147 (2005); Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the
United States: The Unresolved Enigma, 28 MD. L. REV. 1, 1 (1968). Other prominent
examples of scholarship on the meaning of “natural born Citizen” include EDWARD S.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1984, at 38–40 (5th rev. ed. 1984);
CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775–1789: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 137 (1923); Christina S. Lohman, Presidential Eligibility: The
Meaning of the Natural-Born Citizen Clause, 36 GONZ. L. REV. 349, 369–71 (2000); J.
Michael Medina, The Presidential Qualification Clause in this Bicentennial Year: The Need
to Eliminate the Natural Born Citizen Requirement, 12 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 253, 262–68
(1987); Michael Nelson, Constitutional Qualifications for President, 17 PRESIDENTIAL STUD.
Q. 383, 396 (1987); Malinda L. Seymore, The Presidency and the Meaning of Citizenship,
2005 BYU L. REV. 927, 937–41 (2005); John Yinger, The Origins and Interpretation of the
Presidential Eligibility Clause in the U.S. Constitution: Why Did the Founding Fathers Want the
President to Be a “Natural-Born Citizen” and What Does this Clause Mean for Foreign-Born
Adoptees?
(rev.
ed.,
Apr.
6,
2000)
(unpublished
commentary),
http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/jyinger/citizenship/history.htm.
4. See Carl Huse, McCain’s Canal Zone Birth Prompts Queries About Whether That Rules
TIMES
(Feb.
28,
2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/
Him
Out,
N.Y.
2008/02/28/us/politics/28mccain.html (discussing the allegations Barry Goldwater,
George Romney, and John McCain faced during their respective presidential campaigns).
5. See, e.g., Elliott v. Cruz, 137 A.3d 646, 653 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016), aff’d, 134
A.3d 51 (Pa. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 169 (2016).
6. See Williams v. Cruz, OAL DKT. NO. STE 5016-16, 2016 WL 1554252, at *17
(N.J. Admin. Apr. 12, 2016) (holding Cruz to be a “natural born Citizen” and thus an
eligible candidate for the U.S. presidential election in New Jersey); Thomas Lee,
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specific issue is almost certain to arise again: for instance, Cruz may
run for President in 2020 or thereafter, and there will likely be future
U.S. presidential candidates with international ties given the pace and
scope of globalization. Finally, the Natural Born Citizen Clause
provides an illuminating case study in how to do originalism and the
types of sources it entails. The original meaning of constitutional
provisions is often elusive; however, the Natural Born Citizen Clause is
a rare case in which careful examination of all relevant evidence
supplies a meaning.
There are two leading views of the original meaning of the
constitutional requirement to be a “natural born Citizen” for
presidential eligibility. The first, espoused most recently by Professors
Einer Elhauge and Mary Brigid McManamon, is that a natural born
citizen who is eligible to be President is any person born within the
United States, unless the person is the child of a foreign ambassador
or enemy soldier.7 By the same token, any person born outside of the
United States to a U.S. ambassador or to a U.S. soldier in a hostile army
would also be a “natural born Citizen” of the United States.8 The idea
that membership in a polity is determined principally by birthplace is
known by the Latinism jus soli—the “law of soil.”9 Proponents of this
view assert that jus soli was the common law of England as to who was a
“natural born subject,” and that the U.S. Constitution’s “natural born

Opinion-Editorial, Is Ted Cruz a “Natural Born Citizen”? Not if You’re a Constitutional
Originalist., L.A. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/oped/la-oe-lee-is-ted-cruz-eligible-to-be-president-20160110-story.html (explaining that
because Cruz was born in Calgary, Canada to a non-citizen father, an originalist
interpretation of the Constitution would bar him from becoming president).
7. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor Einer Elhauge on the Justiciability and
Meaning of the Natural Born Citizen Requirement at 12, Elliott v. Cruz, 134 A.3d 51
(Pa. 2016) (No. 29 MAP 2016), 2016 WL 2732221, at *12; Mary Brigid McManamon,
The Natural Born Citizen Clause as Originally Understood, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 317, 347
(2015) (concluding that no one born outside the United States to U.S. citizen parents
is “a ‘natural born [C]itizen’” eligible to be President “aside from children born to
U.S. ambassadors or soldiers in hostile armies”).
8. See McManamon, supra note 7, at 347; see also Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor
Einer Elhauge on the Justiciability and Meaning of the Natural Born Citizen
Requirement, supra note 7, at 17 (describing the narrow exception to the native-birth
requirement as including children born to military personnel serving in a foreign
country).
9. Gordon, supra note 3, at 6 (defining jus soli as a “basic tenet of the English
common law”).
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Citizen” requirement for presidential eligibility adopted the same
English meaning.10
This viewpoint is wrong on both counts: jus soli was not the exclusive
rule at English common law, and the English common law of natural
born subjectship was not the exclusive source of the meaning of
“natural born Citizen” in Article II of the U.S. Constitution. “Common
law” in this context means the evolving customary law of England as
reflected not only in judicial decisions, but also in landmark statutes.
Further, early Americans also consulted treatises summarizing English
law, most importantly William Blackstone’s Commentaries.11
First, jus soli may have been the ancient Anglo-Saxon common law
before the Norman conquest of 1066, but it was not the sole principle
of natural born subjectship at English common law when the U.S.
Constitution was adopted centuries later. As historian James Kettner
put it, “English jurists had no conscious attachment to the jus soli . . . .
Ancestry could also determine who was a ‘natural-born subject.’”12 In
fact, starting in 1350, Parliament passed statutes bestowing subject
status upon the foreign-born children of English subjects, thereby
invoking the other great Western natural law birthright principle, jus
sanguinis—the “law of blood” or parentage.13 Jus sanguinis was the
Roman rule of citizenship, and it was long dominant on the European
continent with its shifting borders and overlapping allegiances.14 But,
jus sanguinis penetrated England and then Great Britain, especially in
its eighteenth-century mercantilist phase, by which time Parliament
had long extended “natural born” status to the foreign-born children
of British subjects in government service and of British fathers

10. See McManamon, supra note 7, at 320–21. Although the U.S. Supreme Court
has never decided the meaning of the Natural Born Citizen Clause, it has asserted that
the U.S. constitutional law of citizenship adopts jus soli via English common law. See
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 434 n.11 (1998) (affirming citizenship at birth for
persons born within the United States but noting that U.S. “citizenship does not pass
by descent” other than as provided by congressional statute); Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S.
815, 828 (1971) (acknowledging that the United States follows the English standard of
jus soli where the place of birth governs citizenship).
11. See generally 1–4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.
12. JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 1608–1870 13 (1978).
13. A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea 1350, 25 Edw. 3 stat. 1
(Eng.); see GORDON, supra note 3, at 6 (defining jus sanguinis as the rule determining
nationality in most European countries where “nationality could be transmitted by
descent at the moment of birth”).
14. See KETTNER, supra note 12, at 17–28 (discussing the complications of
nationality arising from allegiances to different countries within the United Kingdom).
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generally.15 Some of the most settled of these statutes, by virtue of their
ancient and uncontroversial status, had become part of the common
law tradition, not departures from it. However, descent by parentage
had a gender skew under natural law in late eighteenth-century Europe
and America: the father’s blood determined the political allegiance of
free persons at birth; the mother was legally irrelevant.16
Second, although English common law was the principal source of
U.S. constitutional law, it was not the only source. The common law
was the taproot of U.S. constitutional provisions with an English
pedigree like habeas corpus and the criminal and civil jury trial rights,
but early Americans did not reflexively adopt the British law of natural
born subjects in defining who was a natural born citizen eligible for the
Presidency. The British Empire had “subjects” whose allegiance to the
Crown was viewed as analogous to a child’s obeisance to a parent, a
bond the Americans had fought to escape.17 “Citizens” of the
American republic, by contrast, were seen as bound by explicit or
implicit consent to a society of equals, analogous to a social contract.18
The ramifications of this political-theory distinction between subject
and citizen for “natural born” status are underappreciated. The
concept of citizenship that Americans embraced attributed greater
independence and agency to individuals to pass on their political
allegiance, by contrast to subjectship which presumed that allegiance
was solely a function of birth within the sovereign’s domains.
Because of the misfit between English monarchical notions of
subjectship and the general republican concept of citizenship, the law
of nations and natural law are also important sources in determining
what “natural born Citizen” in Article II means. Indeed, even
prominent English common law judges like Lord Coke always believed
natural law was the ultimate source of “natural born subject” status and
of the common law generally.19 And there was a direct link between
15. See ALEXANDER COCKBURN, NATIONALITY: OR

LAW RELATING TO SUBJECTS
28–31 (London, William
Ridgway 1869) (describing the development of laws governing nationality in England
and pointing out the long history of English antecedents for the subject status of
children born abroad to English fathers and royal servants).
16. See id. at 11–12 (noting that children born to alien fathers did not inherit
citizenship even if the mother was English).
17. See KETTNER, supra note 12, at 3–4.
18. See id. at 9–10.
19. See Calvin v. Smith (Calvin’s Case), 77 Eng. Rep. 377 391–92 (K.B. 1608)
(affirming the rule that one born on English soil is a natural born subject of the
English king as part of the common law and jura natura—natural laws). See generally
THE

AND ALIENS, CONSIDERED WITH A VIEW TO FUTURE LEGISLATION
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the law of nature and the law of nations: Emer de Vattel, the Swiss
republican jurist who rivaled Blackstone as an essential reference for
Americans on defining citizenship,20 called the law of nations “the law
of nature, applied to the conduct and affairs of nations and
sovereigns.”21 The “law of nations” in Vattel’s usage, shared by early
Americans, included general principles common to all civilized
nations, such as jus sanguinis. In sum, the adopters of the U.S.
Constitution likely accepted both natural law principles, jus soli—for
persons born within the country—and jus sanguinis—for persons born
outside the country to American fathers, in their understanding of
what it means to be a “natural born Citizen” eligible to be President.
And, as a more general matter, they embraced both principles of
citizenship as a means to grow the population and trans-Atlantic
commerce of their new nation.
The other leading view of the original meaning of “natural born
Citizen” in Article II holds that it refers not only to any person born in
the United States (and thus a citizen by jus soli) but also to any person
born abroad who is a U.S. citizen at birth under then-applicable
congressional statutes.22 Proponents of this view, espoused by a
majority of modern commentators, including former U.S. Solicitor
General Paul Clement and former Acting Solicitor General Neal
Katyal,23 Professors Michael Ramsey and Akhil Amar,24 and Judge Jill

Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 73, 74 (1997) (noting Coke’s influence on early American courts and his
assertion that he and his fellow judges were to decide Calvin’s Case on “divine law of
nature” principles that were part of English law and the Creator’s law).
20. A telling marker of the co-equal, canonical status of Blackstone’s and Vattel’s
two books as references on foreign relations law for early Americans was the fact that
they were the first two books the Senate purchased for its library in 1794. See S.
JOURNAL, 3rd Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1793) (ordering the purchase of the Blackstone and
Vattel books for the Senate).
21. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 1 (Béla Kapossy &
Richard Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund 2008) (1797).
22. See McManamon, supra note 7, at 341.
23. See Paul Clement & Neal Katyal, Commentary, On the Meaning of “Natural Born
Citizen,” 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 161 (2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/03/onthe-meaning-of-natural-born-citizen.
24. See Michael D. Ramsey, The Original Meaning of “Natural Born,” 20 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author); Akhil Reed
Amar, Why Ted Cruz Is Eligible to Be President, CNN (Jan. 14, 2016, 11:59 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/13/opinions/amar-cruz-trump-natural-born-citizen.
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Pryor (in her Yale Law Journal Note authored while a student),25 argue
that Congress’s Article I, Section 8 power “[t]o establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization”26 encompasses the power to establish birthright
citizenship for presidential eligibility purposes. With specific respect
to Senator Cruz, many of these commentators assert that he is eligible
to be President because the controlling statute when he was born
declared that children born abroad to one U.S. citizen parent were
U.S. citizens at birth, subject only to a residency requirement for the
parent and child, which Cruz had met.27 This 1952 statute, which had
replaced an earlier 1934 version, codified jus sanguinis subject to
parental and child residency requirements.28
The relevant evidence indicates that this view of complete
congressional discretion over who counts as a “natural born Citizen,”
like the jus soli-only view, is incorrect as a matter of original meaning,
particularly because it paradoxically rejects natural law and embraces
positive law as the basis for natural born citizenship. The founding
Americans who adopted the Constitution did not seek to grant plenary
power to Congress in setting the citizenship standards for presidential
eligibility. Indeed, a proposal by Alexander Hamilton at the 1787
Constitutional Convention to permit Congress to use its uniform
Naturalization Power to set citizenship standards for congressional
eligibility was decisively rejected.29 Nor is there any affirmative
evidence from the Constitution’s drafting or ratifying conventions, or
any sources whatsoever, that supports the claim that Congress’s Article
I Naturalization power encompassed power to tinker with Article II’s
separate “natural born Citizen” requirement. If Congress did have
such a power to define the citizens eligible to be President, then what
was the point of specifying in the Constitution that someone had to be
a natural born citizen to be President? The Constitution could have
simply stated, “No person shall be eligible to the office of President of
the United States unless he . . . be born a Citizen of the United States,”

25. See Jill A. Pryor, Note, The Natural-Born Citizen Clause and Presidential Eligibility: An
Approach for Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty, 97 YALE L.J. 881, 889–90 (1988).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
27. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, tit. 3, ch. 1, § 301(a)(7), 66 Stat. 163, 236.
28. Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-250, 48 Stat. 797, repealed by Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, tit. 3, ch. 1, § 301(a)(7), 66 Stat. 163, 236.
29. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 563 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION] (reporting the vote as
ten-to-one against the proposal); 3 id. at 629 (describing the Hamilton plan’s
citizenship requirements for members of Congress).
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which was what Alexander Hamilton proposed in his alternative plan
for a national constitution.30
In summary, both the jus soli and congressional naturalization power
interpretations are incomplete theories of the original meaning of
“natural born Citizen” in Article II. They share a disregard of the word
“natural” and its plain invocation of natural law birthright principles
that were foundational to the intellectual firmament of the time. Both
theories focus too much on specific English and U.S. naturalization
statutes, without regard for the broader historical and political
contexts in which the statutes were passed and the Article II
requirement was adopted. More generally, both existing theories do
not account for the complexity and evolution in conceptions of
“natural born” membership in England and the early United States.
The right way to ascertain what “natural born Citizen” in Article II
means is to scrutinize all the primary sources to comprehend this
complexity and how the words reflect the intellectual climate and
historical circumstances of the time.
Early Americans, desirous of increasing the immigration of
ambitious Europeans and of encouraging American merchants to go
and trade with Europe, adopted both natural law territorial and
parentage principles to define “natural born” citizenship in their new
republic. Consequently, a careful parsing of all the relevant primary
sources indicates that the Americans who adopted the Constitution
likely considered three categories of persons as natural born citizens:
(1) persons born within the United States; (2) persons born outside of
the United States to U.S. citizens in government service; and (3)
persons born abroad to U.S. citizen fathers who had resided in the
United States but went abroad temporarily for a private purpose, like
merchants. These three categories of persons tracked the two natural
law principles ordaining membership in political communities at birth
by territory (jus soli) and by parentage when children were born
extraterritorially (jus sanguinis). Importantly, however, jus sanguinis in
the late eighteenth century was limited to the foreign-born children of
government servants and of men; it did not encompass descent

30. 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 629 (reprinting
Article IX § 1 of the Hamilton Plan). Hamilton presented his constitutional plan
during a long speech on June 18, 1787, early in the Convention; however, he did not
circulate a written draft then. Hamilton did give James Madison a draft of his plan
later at the Convention. Id. at 619.
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through a private citizen mother where her nationality differed from
the father’s—a much rarer combination at the Founding than today.31
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I parses evidence from 1787
to 1789, when the U.S. Constitution was drafted and adopted,
regarding the original meaning of “natural born Citizen” in Article II.
It begins by describing the relevant constitutional provisions and
discussions at the 1787 Constitutional Convention regarding methods
of selecting the President and eligibility requirements for Congress. It
then analyzes an important letter written by John Jay to George
Washington during the Convention proposing the “natural born
Citizen” provision. Finally, Part I details an important, oft-quoted
intervention by James Madison, one of the principal architects of the
Constitution, in 1789 during a controversy over the citizenship
eligibility of a South Carolina member of the House of Representatives.
Part II surveys the history of natural born subjects as understood at
English common law, including judicial decisions, Parliamentary
statutes, and Blackstone’s monumental treatise, the Commentaries, an
important source of original American constitutional meaning. It then
discusses early American treatises that referred to Blackstone and the
English sources. Part III recounts the treatment of natural born
Citizenship under natural law and the law of nations. Part IV examines
two American statutes that use the phrase “natural born Citizen”: a
previously undiscovered 1784 Maryland statute, and the First
Congress’s 1790 Naturalization Act which has been the subject of
intense scrutiny. A brief conclusion explores the implications of the
recovered original meaning of “natural born Citizen” in Article II of
the U.S. Constitution for presidential eligibility today.
I.

THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF “NATURAL BORN CITIZEN”
IN ARTICLE II

This Part presents and analyzes all the evidence from 1787 to 1789,
when the U.S. Constitution was adopted, relevant to ascertaining the
31. Among prior commentators, my position is closest to that of Edward Corwin
(1878–1963), who also concluded that “natural born Citizen” encompassed both
natural law principles, but without specifying the late eighteenth century natural law
scope of jus sanguinis. Corwin, supra note 3, at 38–39. Corwin asserted, however, that
Congress had broad discretion to define the scope of jus sanguinis by statute. Id. This
position diverges from my claim that the Constitution when adopted between 1787 to
1789 presumed a fixed core of natural law regarding citizenship by birth in the
sovereign’s territory or by parentage limited to the children born outside of the United
States to U.S. citizens serving the government or to private citizen fathers.
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original meaning of Article II’s requirement that a person must be a
“natural born Citizen” to be eligible to be President. There is some
difference of opinion about what exactly an original constitutional
meaning is: is it the intent of the fifty-five drafters, the understanding
of the two thousand or so who participated in up-or-down state
ratification conventions, or the collective views of the American people
from 1787 to 1789 when drafting and ratification occurred? If it is the
last, how is it possible to reconstruct what hundreds of thousands of
people two centuries ago understood “natural born Citizen” to mean?32
For present purposes, I am not going to engage in this methodological
debate33 and will presume that the original meaning we are looking for
is a best estimate of what “natural born Citizen” meant as a
constitutional presidential eligibility provision in 1787 to 1789, based
on a comprehensive analysis of all relevant discussions and sources that
Americans of the time had available to them and would likely have
consulted.
A.

Article II’s Presidential Eligibility Conditions

Because the U.S. Constitution is framed in a written document, any
theory of constitutional meaning must start with its words. Article II,
Section 1 provides in full:
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be
eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible
to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five
Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.34

Article II’s three eligibility criteria of age, residence, and citizenship
are also imposed by Article I for eligibility to be a member of Congress.
Representatives and Senators must be twenty-five and thirty years of
age respectively “when elected.”35 In terms of residence, all members
of Congress must be “Inhabitant[s] of that State in which”

32. According to the 1790 census, there were 807,094 free white males over the
age of sixteen in the United States. RETURN OF THE WHOLE NUMBER OF PERSONS WITHIN
THE SEVERAL DISTRICTS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1793),
https://www.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1790a.pdf.
33. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 3–22 (1996) (describing the challenges of ascertaining original meanings).
34. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
35. Id. art. I, §§ 2–3. Interestingly, the timing of the age requirement appears to
differ from Article II, which would seem to require a presidential candidate to be
thirty-five years of age to be eligible, not “when elected.”
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(Representatives) or “for which” (Senators) “chosen.”36 There is no
constitutional requirement of residential duration for members of
Congress; however, Article II specifies that a person must be “fourteen
Years a Resident within the United States” to be eligible for President.37
With respect to citizenship, Representatives and Senators must be
seven or nine years “a Citizen of the United States,” respectively.38 By
contrast, the Article II citizenship requirement has two non-durational
options: a person must be “a natural born Citizen” or “a Citizen of the
United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution.”39 The
alternative citizenship prong is often neglected because it is now
extinct. But, as described below, an analysis of the prong provides
insight into the meaning of the “natural born Citizen” requirement.40
There is one other provision of the Constitution possibly relevant to
understanding the original meaning of “natural born Citizen.” Article
I, Section 8 of the Constitution lists among the powers that Congress
“shall have” the power “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization.”41 In the pre-constitutional period of the Articles of
Confederation, there was no uniform law of citizenship. Instead, each
state determined who was a citizen, and state citizens were collectively
“citizens of the United States.”42 The Naturalization Clause is the
provision relied upon by advocates of the view that Congress has the
power to make a foreign-born person a “natural born Citizen” for
purposes of Article II by enacting a statute specifying that such a
person is a U.S. citizen at birth, without having to take a loyalty oath or
any other naturalization procedure.
B.

The Constitutional Convention of 1787

The U.S. Constitution was drafted at a convention in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, from May 26 to September 17, 1787.43 The Convention
debates are worth examining not only because they show what the

36. Id. The differing prepositions likely reflected the fact that Senators were to be
chosen “for” each state by its legislature under the original Constitution.
37. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
38. Id. art. I, §§ 2–3.
39. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
40. See infra Section I.B.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
42. See KETTNER, supra note 12, at 213–24 (discussing the notions of citizenship that
developed in the states between the Declaration of Independence and the making of
the Constitution).
43. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at xi–xii.
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delegates who drafted the Constitution were thinking (“original intent”),
but also because the diverse positions taken likely reflected the views
of informed citizens at large (“original public meanings”).44 After
several weeks of discussions among all the delegates—totaling fifty-five,
at peak attendance—a five-person “Committee of Detail,” chaired by
John Rutledge, was elected on July 24, 1787, to prepare the first draft
of the Constitution.45 The Committee’s marching orders included
instructions to draft “a clause or clauses, requiring certain qualifications
of . . . property and citizenship in the United States for the Executive,
the Judiciary, and . . . Members of both branches of the Legislature.”46
The Committee’s first draft was reported to the full Convention on
August 6, 1787.47 Interestingly, the draft only included qualifications
for Congress, not for the President or the Judiciary.48 It stated a
citizenship requirement for Congress but omitted a property
requirement and included age and residence conditions unmentioned
in its mandate.49 The age qualifications did not spark discussion at the
Convention. The citizenship and “Inhabitants” requirements, however,
were roundly debated on August 8 and 9, for reasons that illuminate
the presidential eligibility provisions adopted four weeks later.50
The first proposed citizenship standards for Representatives and
Senators were three years and four years respectively.51 According to
James Madison’s notes of the Convention, on August 8, George Mason
of Virginia objected to the three-year citizenship threshold for
Representatives because he did not desire “to let foreigners and
adventurers make laws for us [and] govern us.”52 Three years of
citizenship were “not enough for ensuring that local knowledge which
ought to be possessed by the Representative.”53 Mason continued: “It
might also happen that a rich foreign Nation, for example Great
Britain, might send over her tools who might bribe their way into the
44. See RAKOVE, supra note 33, at 6.
45. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 97–98.
46. Id. at 116–17. The original proposal specified “landed property” as a
qualification but the word “landed” was voted to be struck. See id. (noting the
movement and passage of striking the word “landed”); see also id. at 121–25 (providing
James Madison’s notes regarding discussion of a property qualification).
47. Id. at 176–77.
48. See id. at 164–65, 178–79.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 213, 216–17, 230–31.
51. See id. at 164–65.
52. Id. at 216.
53. Id.
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Legislature for insidious purposes.”54 He proposed seven years instead,
which was agreed to by all the delegations except for Connecticut.55
Mason’s remarks about foreign influence in government mirrored a
speech that his fellow Virginian Madison had made two weeks earlier
on July 25, 1787.56 The context of Madison’s speech was a heated
discussion as to whether the Executive should be chosen by the national
legislature, state governors, the people, or some other electors.57 The
issue was a thorny one that was debated over several days at the
Convention.58 On July 24, 1787, the discussion had run in favor of a
President chosen by Congress with a long term limit to ensure that
whomever was elected would not be beholden to the legislators who
had picked him.59 The danger with this design, as Gouverneur Morris,
the New York émigré who was part of Pennsylvania’s delegation,
pointed out, was dictatorship.60 The President might “cease to be a
man . . . unwilling to quit his exaltation,” but insulated from removal
by “possession of the sword.”61 The leading counter-proposal was
championed by Eldridge Gerry of Massachusetts who believed allowing
the national legislature to pick the President was “radically and
incurably wrong.”62 Gerry proposed that state governors “with advice
of their Councils” appoint the President.63
It was at this point that Madison spoke firmly against Congress
selecting the Executive in large part because it would allow “foreign
powers” to manipulate, bribe, or influence legislators into picking the
President they wanted. Madison reasoned that:
The Ministers of foreign powers would have and make use of, the
opportunity [to] mix their intrigues & influence with the Election.
Limited as the powers of the Executive are, it will be an object of
great moment with the great rival powers of Europe who have
American possessions, to have at the head of our Governmt. a man
attached to their respective politics & interests. No pains, nor

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
See id.
Compare id. at 109–11 (Madison’s remarks), with id. at 216, 218 (Mason’s remarks).
Id. at 95, 98–101, 103, 105, 108–09, 115, 118–19.
See id.
Id. at 99–104.
Id. at 103–04.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 109.
Id.
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perhaps expence, will be spared, to gain from the Legislature an
appointmt. favorable to their wishes.64

Madison’s point about the national legislature’s vulnerability to
foreign influence in selecting a President resonated with diverse
delegates. Mason, for instance, said he “preferred on the whole”
Congress picking the President, but that “[c]andor obliged him to
admit, that there was great danger of foreign influence, as had been
suggested. This was the most serious objection with him that had been
urged.”65 Pierce Butler of South Carolina opined: “The two great evils
to be avoided are cabal at home, & influence from abroad. It will be
difficult to avoid either if the Election be made by the Natl
Legislature.”66 Hugh Williamson of North Carolina was also “sensible
that strong objections lay agst an election of the Executive by the
Legislature, and that it opened a door for foreign influence.”67
In sum, the convention debates on presidential selection indicate a
broad consensus that Congress ought not to select the President
directly because it was too vulnerable to foreign influence.68 The
debate occurred a month before the “natural born Citizen” language
for presidential eligibility was adopted. Why then, should the
Constitution be interpreted to give Congress a free hand in defining
who is a “natural born Citizen” eligible to be President? If early
Americans feared that a powerful foreign state like Great Britain might
influence Congress to select the President it wanted, why would they
not have feared that Congress might enact a statute making any person
64. Id. Madison saw the same problem with appointment by state governors,
although it would be more diffuse: “An appointment by the State Executives, was
liable . . . to this insuperable one, that being standing bodies, they could & would be
courted, and intrigued with by the Candidates, by their partizans, and by the Ministers
of foreign powers.” Id. at 110.
65. Id. at 112.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 113. A month later, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina proposed a new
provision, now Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 (with only minor revisions from Pinckney’s
suggestion), also to protect against foreign influence of national officials which the
delegates unanimously adopted, apparently without discussion: “No person holding
any office of profit or trust under the [United States], shall without the consent of the
Legislature, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever,
from any King, Prince or foreign State.” Id. at 389. As Edmund Randolph explained
at the Virginia ratifying convention: “It was thought proper, in order to exclude
corruption and foreign influence, to prohibit any one in office from receiving or
holding any emoluments from foreign states.” 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 327.
68. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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to be born in England eligible to be President? Those who believe that
Congress has power to say who is a “natural born Citizen” eligible to be
President under the Naturalization Clause have pointed to no
evidence from the time when the Constitution was adopted to support
their theory. This is unsurprising. The Article I Naturalization Clause
takes away the states’ power to determine who can be a citizen of the
United States and gives it to Congress for uniformity’s sake. It does not
have anything to do with giving Congress the power to set citizenship
eligibility conditions for the Presidency. Only Article II of the
Constitution says who can be President; it would be a violation of the
Constitution’s separation of powers if Congress could do so by
enacting a statute under its Article I powers.
Let us return, then, to the constitutional convention debates about
congressional citizenship requirements to see how they illuminate the
constitutional rule of presidential citizenship. On August 8, 1787,
Mason’s motion to increase citizenship rules for Representatives from
three to seven years passed.69 The next day, there was extensive
discussion of a new proposal introduced by Gouverneur Morris to raise
the citizenship requirement for Senators from four to fourteen years.70
An increase seemed called for, given that the citizenship duration for
the lower chamber of Congress now stood at seven years.71 To support
his motion, Morris pointed to the “danger of admitting strangers into
our public Councils.”72 Charles Pinckney added that there was
“peculiar danger and impropriety” in permitting members with
“foreign attachments” into the Senate given its foreign affairs powers.73
George Mason “highly approved” of Morris’s motion and opined that
“[w]ere it not that many not natives of this Country had acquired great
merit during the revolution, he should be for restraining the eligibility
into the Senate, to natives.”74 Pierce Butler, Pinckney’s fellow South
Carolinian, also favored a long citizenship condition, on the view that
“foreigners . . . bring with them, not only attachments to other
Countries; but ideas of Govt. so distinct from ours that in every point

69. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 213, 216–17.
70. Id. at 235.
71. See id. at 239 (statement of John Rutledge) (explaining that the Senate
citizenship requirement should be longer than the citizenship cut-off for the House of
Representatives because the Senate was a more powerful body).
72. Id. at 235.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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of view they are dangerous . . . . He mentioned the great strictness
observed in Great Britain on this subject.”75
Prominent members of the Convention objected to Morris’s
proposal. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, future Chief Justice of the
U.S. Supreme Court, thought it would “discourag[e] meritorious
aliens from emigrating to this Country.”76 Benjamin Franklin of
Pennsylvania was of similar mind, noting that it looked “illiberal” and
that “we have many good Friends in Engld. & other parts of Europe”
who “ought not to be excluded” from the possibility of high office as
an inducement to immigrate.77
We found in the Course of the Revolution, that many strangers
served us faithfully—and that many natives took part agst. their
Country. When foreigners after looking about for some other
Country in which they can obtain more happiness, give a preference
to ours, it is a proof of attachment which ought to excite our
confidence & affection.78

Future first U.S. Attorney General Edmund Randolph of Virginia
“could never agree” to a proposal “disabling” foreigners for fourteen
years from “participat[ion] in the public honours.”79 He “reminded
the Convention of the language held by our patriots during the
Revolution, and the principles laid down in all our American
Constitutions. Many foreigners may have fixed their fortunes among
us under the faith of these invitations.”80 Future Supreme Court Justice
James Wilson, who had emigrated from Scotland to Pennsylvania in his
twenties, “rose with feelings,” confessed to “not being a native,” and
pointed out that “if the ideas of some gentlemen should be pursued,”
he would be “incapacitated from holding a place under the very
Constitution which he had shared in the trust of making.”81
James Madison also spoke against increasing the constitutional U.S.
citizenship requirement for Senators from four to fourteen years. He
began by stating he “was not averse to some restrictions on this subject;
but could never agree to the proposed amendment.”82 His next points

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 236.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 236–37.
Id. at 237.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 235.

344

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:327

are highly significant to the current debate about the original meaning
of the Natural Born Citizen Clause.
[A]ny restriction . . . in the Constitution [is] unnecessary and
improper. unnecessary; because the Natl. Legislre. is to have the
right of regulating naturalization, and can by virtue thereof fix
different periods of residence as conditions of enjoying different
privileges of Citizenship: Improper: because it will give a tincture
of illiberality to the Constitution: because it will put it out of the
power of the Natl Legislature even by special acts of naturalization
to confer the full rank of Citizens on meritorious strangers . . . .83

Madison was clearly proposing that the citizenship requirements for
Senators be left to future Congresses under what would become their
Article I naturalization powers. This is precisely the view championed
by those who favor an interpretation of the Natural Born Citizen
Clause as giving Congress discretion to determine presidential
eligibility by statutes on the books at the time of birth like Akhil Amar,
Paul Clement, Neal Katyal, and Michael Ramsey.84 The other delegates
decisively rejected Madison’s suggestion of leaving citizenship
conditions for eligibility to office up to Congress in favor of hard-wiring
a term-of-years requirement. Morris, for instance, spoke directly
against Madison’s idea because “[t]here was no knowing what
Legislatures would do.”85 Morris’s motion to increase the citizenship
requirement from four to fourteen years failed by a vote of four states
to seven; he then moved for thirteen years which failed by the same
vote.86 Pinckney moved for ten years which also failed four-to-seven.87
Randolph proposed nine years as a compromise, which was finally
accepted by a vote of six-to-four.88
The next day, August 10, 1787, James Wilson moved to reconsider
the citizenship requirement for the House of Representatives and
prevailed by a narrow six-to-five vote.89 The debates to reconsider took
83. Id. at 235–36. Madison’s position here is admittedly somewhat at odds with his
position against direct election of the President by Congress for fear of foreign influence.
84. See Amar, supra note 24 (arguing that Congress has the authority to interpret
the presidential eligibility rules under the Constitution); see also Ramsey, supra note 24,
(manuscript at 33–34) (asserting that the Naturalization Clause permits Congress to
define who is a “natural born Citizen” eligible to be President because the British
Parliament passed statutes defining “natural born subjects”).
85. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 238.
86. See id. at 238–39.
87. See id. at 239.
88. One state’s delegates were evenly divided. See id.
89. Id. at 251.
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place three days later on August 13, 1787.90 Wilson and Randolph from
Virginia proposed to decrease it to four years from the seven years
Mason had successfully urged.91 Gerry from Massachusetts was
vehemently opposed and asserted that eligibility should be exclusively
“confined to Natives”92:
Foreign powers will intermeddle in our affairs, and spare no
expence to influence them. Persons having foreign attachments will
be sent among us & insinuated into our councils, in order to be
made instruments for their purposes. Every one knows the vast sums
laid out in Europe for secret services—He was not singular in these
ideas. A great many of the most influential men in Massts. reasoned
in the same manner.93

Williamson of North Carolina was of similar sentiment and urged an
upward revision “to insert [nine] years instead of seven.”94
It was at this point that Alexander Hamilton of New York, himself a
juvenile emigrant born in the British Crown possession of Nevis in the
West Indies, intervened. While conceding the “possible danger” of
foreign influence, he asserted that “the advantage of encouraging
foreigners was obvious & admitted”95:
Persons in Europe of moderate fortunes will be fond of coming here
where they will be on a level with the first Citizens. He moved that
the section be so altered as to require merely Citizenship &
inhabitancy. The right of determining the rule of naturalization will
then leave a discretion to the Legislature on this subject which will
answer every purpose.96

James Madison seconded Hamilton’s motion, which was
unsurprising since it was the same idea Madison himself had suggested
as to the Senate citizenship requirements four days earlier on August
9, 1787.97 He continued:
There was a possible danger he admitted that men with foreign
predilections might obtain appointments but it was by no means
probable that it would in any dangerous degree. For the same

90. Id. at 267.
91. Id. at 268. Madison’s notes for August 10 reported that Wilson had moved for
a reduction back to the original requirement of three years. See id. at 251. The Journal
reported the motion and the vote but not the specifics. See id. at 247.
92. Id. at 268.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Id.; see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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reason that they would be attached to their native Country, our own
people wd. prefer natives of this Country to them. Experience
proved this to be the case. Instances were rare of a foreigner being
elected by the people within any short space after his coming among
us—If bribery was to be practised by foreign powers, it would not be
attempted among the electors, but among the elected; and among
natives having full Confidence of the people not among strangers
who would be regarded with a jealous eye.98

Wilson withdrew his own separate motion for three years and
supported Hamilton’s motion for Congress to set citizenship
conditions, offering evidence from Pennsylvania.99 “He remarked that
almost all the Genl. officers of [the Pennsylvania militia] were foreigners.
And no complaint had ever been made against their fidelity or merit.
Three of her deputies to the Convention (Mr. R. Morris, Mr.
Fitzsimmons & himself) were also not natives.”100 Pierce Butler of
South Carolina, however, remained “strenuous” against “admitting
foreigners into our public Councils.”101 His sentiments appeared more
in line with the majority view. In fact, Hamilton’s motion to leave
congressional citizenship requirements to Congress under its
Naturalization Clause power failed by a vote of four (Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia) in favor and seven against.102
The August 13, 1787, failure of Alexander Hamilton’s motion is a
highly significant piece of evidence that other commentators on the
Natural Born Citizen Clause have neglected. Like Madison on August
9, Hamilton proposed to “leave a discretion to the Legislature” to
decide the “rule of naturalization” for Representatives pursuant to
Congress’s Article I naturalization power.103
Unlike Madison,
Hamilton actually put the proposal to a vote, where it was rejected by
a vote of seven-states-to-four.104 True, it was a discussion of the
constitutional citizenship requirements for Congress, not President.
But, if early Americans were so concerned about leaving discretion to
Congress on citizenship standards for the legislative branch, there
would have been an even stronger case for not doing so with respect

98. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 268–69.
99. Id. at 269.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. Williamson’s motion to increase the requirement to nine years and Wilson’s
renewed motion to decrease it to four years also failed, both by three-to-eight votes.
103. Id. at 268.
104. Id. at 269.
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to the chief executive, who would be commander-in-chief of the armed
forces, and whose qualifications and powers were separately set forth
in Article II of the Constitution.
After Hamilton’s motion to leave citizenship standards for the
Legislative Branch to Congress under its naturalization power was
rejected, Gouverneur Morris proposed a “proviso” exempting “any
person now a Citizen” from the requirement of seven years of
citizenship.105 John Mercer of Maryland seconded the motion in order
to prevent “disfranchisement” of foreigners who had become citizens
believing they were to be “level in all respects with natives.”106 Roger
Sherman of Connecticut rejoined that the individual states made such
foreigners citizens, not the United States, which “have not invited
foreigners nor pledged their faith that they should enjoy equal
privileges with native Citizens” and were “therefore . . . at liberty to
make any discriminations they may judge requisite.”107 Madison
vehemently disagreed with Sherman’s suggestion that the new United
States would owe no obligation undertaken by the states, decrying it as
a “subt[lety] by which every national engagement might be evaded,”
including public debts and foreign treaties.108
The proviso was defeated by a five-to-six vote, for reasons that remain
unclear.109 It may have been because, as Morris pointed out, the
carveout was only justified for foreigners who were citizens when the
new republic was founded. Consequently, it would have had a brief
lifespan and might have seemed unnecessary, since the minimum age
to be a Representative was only twenty-five years of age.110 But, as we
shall see, the concept of an exception for foreigners who were already
citizens of the states when they adopted the Constitution between 1787
and 1789 would reappear in Article II regarding the Presidency, which
has a minimum age of thirty-five years.111
Although the Committee of Detail had been tasked to draft
qualifications for all three branches, its draft only contained requirements
for the legislative.112 Accordingly, Eldridge Gerry of Massachusetts moved
on August 20, 1787, to instruct the Committee “to report proper
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 270.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 272.
See id. at 271.
See infra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 177–89.
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qualifications for the President.”113 The Committee presented its first
draft of what would become Article II’s presidential eligibility provision
on August 22, as part of a list of “additions” to the draft constitution it
had delivered on August 6.114 The draft provision stated: “[H]e shall
be of the age of thirty five years, and a Citizen of the United States, and
shall have been an Inhabitant thereof for Twenty one years.”115
As the Convention deliberated on other more pressing aspects of the
draft constitution, the Committee of Detail’s presidential eligibility
draft provision was referred on August 31, 1787, to a “Committee of
Eleven” (also known as the “Committee on Postponed Matters”)116
composed of members from each of the states represented at the
Convention including James Madison as the member from Virginia.117
On September 4, this Committee reported the first version of the
Natural Born Citizen Clause to the Convention at large:
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the U. S. at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution shall be eligible to the
office of President: nor shall any Person be elected to that office,
who shall be under the age of 35 years, and who has not been in the
whole, at least 14 years a resident within the U. S.118

113. Id. at 344. Interestingly, no one moved for eligibility provisions for the judicial
branch, despite their mention in the original guidance to the Committee of Detail,
and so there are none in Article III.
114. Id. at 366–68.
115. Id. at 367.
116. See id. at 367, 473 (noting that the Convention moved forward without voting on
the proposed presidential eligibility provision; therefore, it was postponed by default).
117. See id. at 473. This was the third “Committee of Eleven” composed of members
representing each attending State. The first Committee had been proposed and
appointed on July 2, 1787, to tackle the thorny question of equal representation of the
States in the Senate. See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 516.
The second Committee of Eleven had been proposed and appointed on August 25 to
deal with uniform customs duties and fees. 2 id. at 410.
118. Id. at 494. The notes of Pierce Butler, South Carolina’s member on the third
Committee of Eleven, present a slightly different version, which may have been a
working draft in committee:
“No Person shall be eligible to the Office of President who shall not have
arrived at the Age of 30 Years; neither shall any person so eligible who shall
not be a natural born Citizen of the United States, excepting those who now
are or at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution shall be a Citizen of the
said States any one of whom may be President, provided that at the time of his
Election He shall have been an Inhabitant for fourteen Years.”
SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
253 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987).
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This provision was approved without objection or discussion on
September 7, 1787.119 It was slightly modified to the present version by
a five-person Committee of Style and Arrangement (on which Madison
also served) appointed on September 8 that produced the final draft
on September 12.120
The August 22 first draft of the presidential eligibility provision
differed from the September 12 final version of Article II in three
important respects. First, the simple requirement of citizenship was
replaced by a requirement of being a “natural born Citizen, or a Citizen
of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of [the] Constitution”
(i.e., 1787 to 1789).121 Second, the qualification of being an
“Inhabitant” of the United States was changed to one of being a
“Resident within the United States.”122 Third, the prior requirement
of twenty-one years as an “Inhabitant” was reduced to fourteen years as
a “Resident.”123 We shall see below what happened between August
31—the date that the presidential eligibility provision was sent to the
Committee on Postponed Matters—and September 4—the date on
which the first version of the Natural Born Citizen Clause was
introduced for discussion.
The thorough dissection above of the convention debates of July 25
and August 8, 9, 10, and 13, 1787, yields valuable insights about two of
these changes and some circumstantial evidence about the third and
most important—the incorporation of the “natural born Citizen”
requirement. First, the debates of August 9 confirm the commonsense
impression that the substitution of “Resident” for “Inhabitant” was
intended to mandate a greater level of presence in the United States,

119. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 536.
120. Again, the final version stated:
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at
the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of
President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have
attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident
within the United States.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. None of the changes seem substantive—possibly, the final
version might be construed as requiring fourteen years of continuous residence as
opposed to “in the whole.”
121. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (emphasis added), with 2 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 367 (August 22 draft presidential eligibility provision).
122. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5, with 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 367.
123. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5, with 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 367.
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akin to an intent to stay there permanently. Mere presence for
fourteen years would not suffice. The longer quantitative requirement
of twenty-one years as an “Inhabitant” was exchanged for a deeper
qualitative durational threshold of fourteen years as a “Resident.”
Second, the August 13, 1787, debate about Morris’s proviso for
foreigners who were currently citizens foreshadows Article II’s
provision “grandfathering” any person who was a “Citizen of the
United States” at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.124 Since
there was no uniform national citizenship standard under the preconstitutional Articles of Confederation, the reference must be
construed as a requirement that any person who was a citizen of one
of the United States was eligible to be President.125 This alternative
criterion for presidential eligibility is now extinct, but its mere
existence is highly significant. It is absolute: there is no requirement
of citizenship duration, residence, or inhabitation. A person need not
have been a citizen of one of the United States at birth; thus, Alexander
Hamilton, for instance, would plainly have been eligible. Indeed, a
person could have been a citizen for less than a year and still have
qualified to be President, including foreigners who had gained
citizenship by coming to fight in the Revolutionary War.
Why was it viewed as a sufficient qualification to be President to have
been a citizen at the creation of the country? Its rationale seems plain
enough. The only plausible explanation is a belief that participation
in forming the new political community of the United States as a
“Citizen” gave a person the right to run to lead it. Joseph Story
reasoned that the one-time exception emerged “out of respect to those
distinguished revolutionary patriots who were born in a foreign land,
and yet had entitled themselves to high honours in their adopted
country. A positive exclusion of them from the office would have been
unjust to their merits and painful to their sensibilities.”126 It is a
powerful statement about the privileges and rights of “citizenship” in
the new Republic: in their prior lives as “subjects” of the British King,
no American could aspire to be the head of state (i.e., the king or
queen).127 This is one key reason why it is dangerous to rely uncritically
on usages of “natural born subject” in English common law for insight
124. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 5.
125. See KETTNER, supra note 12, at 213–24 (summarizing the states’ varying
naturalization requirements under the Articles of Confederation).
126. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1479 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., William S. Hein & Co., 5th ed. 1994) (1891).
127. See COCKBURN, supra note 15, at 27–29.
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into the meaning of “natural born Citizen” as a constitutional
requirement to be the U.S. President. Semantic similarities should not
override a fundamental difference in the two political orders.
A third clue gained from scrutinizing the debates of congressional
citizenship eligibility was the presence of a broad consensus that the
purpose for the requirements was a fear of foreign influence on the
new federal government. As Story explained, echoing the concerns
voiced by Constitutional Convention delegates regarding the methods
of selecting the President and congressional citizenship requirements:
[T]he general propriety of the exclusion of foreigners, in common
cases, will scarcely be doubted by any sound statesman. It cuts off all
chances for ambitious foreigners, who might otherwise be intriguing
for the office; and interposes a barrier against those corrupt interferences
of foreign governments in executive elections, which have inflicted the
most serious evils upon the elective monarchies of Europe. Germany,
Poland, and even the Pontificate of Rome, are sad, but instructive
examples of the enduring mischiefs arising from this source.128

This concern about foreign influence was balanced against the
strong desire to encourage Europeans to emigrate to the United States,
particularly men of merit who were hospitable to the new republic’s
political ideals.129 But why, then, did the delegates not simply follow
the pattern of the congressional provisions and add a longer term of
years, say, fourteen years for the President, as compared to seven years
for Representatives and nine years for Senators? Such an option may
have seemed impractical because a “citizen of the United States” only
came into being upon declaration of independence from Great Britain
on July 4, 1776.130 That was just eleven years before the Convention,
and so using any duration longer than the nine years for Senators was
problematic. But, as we shall see, there is persuasive evidence that the

128. See Story, supra note 126, § 1479.
129. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 235 (noting the
concern of Convention members that increasing certain residency requirements
would discourage immigration).
130. See DAVID RAMSAY, A DISSERTATION ON THE MANNER OF ACQUIRING THE
CHARACTER AND PRIVILEGES OF A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (Charleston 1789)
(“This accounts for the use of the word resident in that paragraph of the new
constitution, which describes the qualifications of the president of the United States.
The Senators must be citizens nine years, and the representatives seven years; but it is
not said, that the president must be a citizen for fourteen years. The thing was
impossible, for independence was then not quite twelve years declared; therefore the
word resident was introduced in order to comprehend time before the declaration of
independence.”).
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Article II phrase “natural born Citizen” was not arrived at by a process
of elimination, but rather, affirmatively originated by a letter written
by John Jay in late July 1787 to George Washington at the
Constitutional Convention.
C.

Jay Letter of July 25, 1787

At the time of the Convention, John Jay, who had led the
negotiations on the Peace Treaty with Great Britain, was the
Continental Congress’s Secretary for Foreign Affairs in his native New
York.131 On July 22, 1787, a couple days before the Convention at large
in Philadelphia adjourned to entrust the Committee of Detail with the
task of coming up with the first draft of the Constitution, Washington
wrote a letter for Commodore John Paul Jones of the Continental Navy
to carry to France.132 He mailed the letter to Jay in New York with a
cover note for Jay to deliver it to Jones, who was awaiting transport
there.133 Jay wrote a brief, three-sentence note to Washington dated
July 25, 1787, to acknowledge receipt of the letter and to explain why
Jones had not shipped out right away. The note also offered
Washington a “hint.”
Dear Sir
I was this morning honored with your Excellency’s Favor of the
22d Inst: & immediately delivered the Letter it enclosed to
Commodore Jones, who being detained by Business, did not go in
the french Packet, which sailed Yesterday.
Permit me to hint, whether it would not be wise & seasonable to
provide a strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the
administration of our national Government, and to declare
expressly that the Command in chief of the american army shall not
be given to, nor devolved on, any but a natural born Citizen.134

131. Jay,
John,
(1745–1829),
BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY
U.S.
CONGRESS,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=J000065 (last visited Nov. 30, 2017).
132. See Letter from George Washington to John Paul Jones (July 22, 1787), in 5
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, CONFEDERATION SERIES, 1 FEBRUARY 1787–31
DECEMBER 1787 268 (W. W. Abbot ed., 1997).
133. “Will you permit me to give you the trouble of the inclosed for Commodore
Jones—It is at his request I do it—I offer best wish to Mrs Jay and with every sentiments
of esteem and regard. I have the honor to be Dr Sir Yr very Affe. Serva[n]t G.
Washington.” Id. at 268 n.2 (alteration in original).
134. Letter from John Jay to George Washington (July 25, 1787), in 5 THE PAPERS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, CONFEDERATION SERIES, 1 FEBRUARY 1787–31 DECEMBER 1787,
supra note 132, at 271–72.

2017]

“NATURAL BORN CITIZEN”

353

Washington did not write back for several weeks. When he did reply,
he wrote an equally brief note to Jay from Philadelphia dated
September 2, 1787, which thanked him for the “hints contained in
your letter.”135
Dear Sir,
I avail myself of the polite assurance of your last, to trouble you
with the enclosed. If the Commodore should have left New York,
you would oblige me by forwarding it.
....
I thank you for the hints contained in your letter, and with best
wishes for Mrs Jay, and great affection for yourself I am—Dear Sir Yr
Most Obedt Servt.136

The September 2, 1787, date of Washington’s reply to Jay supports a
strong inference that Washington had passed Jay’s “hint” to others at
the Convention.137 Washington was unanimously voted President of
the Convention at its start and said very little during it138—surely,
anything he suggested would have had an effect. And, as noted above,
the Committee of Detail’s draft presented to the Convention on
August 22, 1787, had not included the phrase “natural born Citizen.”
The draft constitution had been referred to the third Committee of
Eleven on August 31, 1787, on which Madison served as the Virginia
representative.139 Madison was close to Washington, a fellow Virginian,
and had been instrumental in persuading Washington to attend the
Convention.140 The Committee reported its version of the presidential
eligibility provision with “natural born Citizen” to the Convention at
large on September 4, 1787, exactly two days after the date of
Washington’s reply to Jay.141

135. Letter from George Washington to John Jay (Sept. 2, 1787), in 5 THE PAPERS
CONFEDERATION SERIES, 1 FEBRUARY 1787–31 DECEMBER 1787,
supra note 132, at 208.
136. Id. at 207–08.
137. It is also possible that Jay wrote to others at the Convention, although I was
unable to find any other relevant letters in Jay’s papers.
138. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 3.
139. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 473.
140. See William P. Kladky, Constitutional Convention, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT
VERNON, http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/constitutionalconvention (last visited Nov. 30, 2017) (explaining that Washington was worried that
his attendance would be perceived as a power play, but that Madison and General
Henry Knox persuaded him to attend the Convention).
141. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 493–94 (reporting
the presentation of the draft, including the Natural Born Citizen Clause).
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON,
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Given these striking coincidences of timing, scholars have coalesced
around the view that Jay’s letter was the smoking-gun source of the use
of “natural born Citizen” in Article II. What was Jay’s reason for writing
the letter to Washington, presumptively shared by the Constitution’s
framers, ratifiers, and the public at large? The conventional view touts
the concern about foreign influence in domestic American politics
that had fueled the Convention debates about congressional
citizenship requirements: the fear that a European pretender would
become President and import monarchy as the political order of the
new United States. As Akhil Amar tartly put it, “Foreign-born princes
might be good enough to rule in the Old World but should be kept
out of the New World order—or at least the New World presidency.”142
The Congressional Research Service summarized the standard
thinking this way in 2011:
The apparent purposes . . . were thus to assure the requisite fealty
and allegiance to the nation from the person to be the chief
executive of the United States, and to prevent wealthy foreign
citizens, and particularly wealthy foreign royalty and their relatives,
from coming to the United States, becoming naturalized citizens,
and then scheming and buying their way into the Presidency or
creating an American monarchy.143

Scholars have surmised that Prince Frederick Augustus of Great
Britain, the second son of George III and Duke of York and Albany,
and Prince Henry of Prussia, one of the younger sons of King Frederick
William I of Prussia, may have been the “foreign born princes” that
people had in mind.144 Charles Thach fingered a third suspect,
asserting “there can be little doubt” it was Baron Friedrich Wilhelm
von Steuben “whom Jay had in mind when he penned these words,”
given von Steuben’s “sympathies” for Shays’ Rebellion and “suspected
dealings with Prince Henry.”145
But the conventional view of protecting against an “Old World”
European “creating an American monarchy,” as asserted by the
142. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 165 (2005).
143. MASKELL, supra note 3, at 8.
144. Id. at 7.
145. THACH, supra note 3, at 137. Despite Thach’s surmise about Jay’s intent, von
Steuben in fact was likely eligible, as he appears to have been granted citizenship in at
least two states (New Jersey and New York) and possibly a third (Pennsylvania) before
the adoption of the Constitution. See infra note 350 and accompanying text. Thus,
even if he was not a “natural born Citizen,” he would be eligible for President by virtue
of having been a citizen when the Constitution was adopted. See U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 1, cl. 5.
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Congressional Research Service report and Amar, is only half the story.
Nor are the usual suspects credible. True, Jay’s letter advised “a strong
check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our
national Government.”146 Jay’s words mirrored Mason’s remarks
against letting “foreigners and adventurers make laws for us & govern
us” that resulted in the enhanced seven- and nine-year citizenship
requirements for Congress.147 But, either the original draft’s twentyone-year “Inhabitant” requirement or the adopted fourteen-year
“Resident” requirement would have addressed this issue of European
princes with no connection to the United States becoming President.
Why, then, the additional felt need for a “natural born Citizen”?
The answer begins with the observation that Jay’s hint specifically
addressed the President’s role as military commander, not as head of
state or chief executive of the domestic political order. To wit, he
advised that the Constitution ought “to declare expressly that the
Command in chief of the american army shall not be given to, nor
devolved on, any but a natural born Citizen.”148 But why was it so
important to him that the army not fall into the hands of someone who
was not a natural born citizen? Whom did Jay have in mind?
I believe that Jay was thinking not about Prince Frederick William,
Prince Henry, or Baron von Steuben, but rather about the Marquis de
Lafayette. Jay wrote to Washington on July 25, 1787, to tell him he had
passed on Washington’s letter for John Paul Jones to take to France. If
Jay did not know for sure, then he must have guessed that the likely
recipient of this letter was Lafayette, Washington’s beloved former
aide-de-camp. Two letters that Washington wrote Lafayette during the
Constitutional Convention survive: one dated June 6, 1787,149 and the
other dated August 15, 1787.150 Washington also wrote one letter to

146. Letter from John Jay to George Washington, supra note 134, at 271–72.
147. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 216 (arguing that three
years of citizenship was not enough to ensure knowledge of local customs and problems).
148. Letter from John Jay to George Washington, supra note 134, at 271–72.
149. See 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 34.
150. Id. at 69.
Altho’ the business of the Fœderal Convention is not yet clos’d, nor I, thereby,
enabled to give you an account of its proceedings; yet, the opportunity
afforded by Commodore Paul Jones’ Return to France is too favourable for
me to omit informing you, that the present expectation of the members is,
that it will end about the first of next month; when, or as soon after as it shall
be in my power, I will communicate the result of our long deliberation to you.
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Thomas Jefferson, the American Minister to France dated May 30,
1787, early in the Convention.151 Even if Jay saw Jefferson as a possible
recipient of Washington’s letter, he would likely have thought of Lafayette
anyway; Jefferson was widely known to have become close to Lafayette,
whose republican ambitions for France he heartily supported.152
Like the two foreign princes and the baron, Lafayette had military
experience.153 But, unlike the princes, Lafayette was wildly popular
among the American people and their senior leaders, most notably
George Washington himself.154 The Frenchman had named his son
George Washington.155 Lafayette had heroically led actual elements of
the “American army” in battle and was personally instrumental in the
critical American victory at Yorktown.156 Jay himself, of FrenchHuguenot descent, was fond of Lafayette;157 leading Americans like
Jefferson feared for the Frenchman’s safety given his leadership in the
pro-democracy movement in France.158 Indeed, Jay expressed relief
that some American states had granted Lafayette land in case he were
exiled for his political agitation.159 In sum, Lafayette was a person who

Id. Farrand reports the date of this letter as August 15, 1787, but its reference to
“Jones’ Return to France” suggests that it may have been the original letter Washington
had sent to Jay on July 22, 1787, which triggered Jay’s momentous reply note.
151. Id. at 31. “The business of this convention is as yet too much in embryo to
form any opinion of the conclusion.” Id.
152. See Thomas Jefferson:
A Revolutionary World, LIBR. CONGRESS,
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/jeffworld.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2017)
(explaining that Jefferson became a galvanizing figure for the French Revolution and
let Lafayette-led rebels use his French home as a meeting point).
153. See Lloyd S. Kramer, America’s Lafayette and Lafayette’s America: A European and
the American Revolution, 38 WM. & MARY Q. 228, 229 (1981) (noting that Lafayette’s
“presence in the Continental army lent an aura of legitimacy and of European support
to the American struggle”).
154. See id. at 229 (asserting that Washington’s acceptance, praise, and support of
Lafayette contributed to his unprecedented popularity among Americans).
155. JAMES R. GAINES, FOR LIBERTY AND GLORY: WASHINGTON, LAFAYETTE, AND THEIR
REVOLUTIONS 8 (2007).
156. Kramer, supra note 153, at 240 (“Lafayette had closed off Cornwallis’s escape
from Yorktown, thereby assuring the military victory that achieved the war’s most
important political goal.”).
157. See WALTER STAHR, JOHN JAY: FOUNDING FATHER 176 (2005) (“Jay disliked the French
government, but he liked many individual Frenchmen, notably the Marquis de Lafayette.”).
158. See GAINES, supra note 155, at 214, 224, 339 (noting that Jefferson’s fear for
Lafayette’s safety later proved to be justified since Lafayette was imprisoned for his role
in the French Revolution).
159. See id. at 214 (highlighting Jefferson’s desire for the states to make an honorary
gift of land to Lafayette because “the day might be coming ‘when it might serve as an
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might actually be elected President of the United States, and thus its
military chieftain, without the need for foreign intrigue or bribes.
I do not mean to suggest that Jay was proposing a constitutional bar
to presidential eligibility specifically to block Lafayette. Rather, I
believe that what Jay feared was the possibility of the election to the
U.S. Presidency of someone like Lafayette with strong sympathies with
the republican cause in Europe who would then seek to deploy
American armies in aid of revolutionary war there. The concern was
certainly not far-fetched. After the French Revolution the following
year, there was great support for coming to revolutionary France’s
military assistance.160 Some, like Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson,
believed that the United States was legally obligated to assist
revolutionary France because of the U.S.-French alliance treaty.161 In
other words, there were two fundamental, inter-related concerns
animating the Natural Born Citizen Clause: not only preventing
European intervention in American domestic politics, but also
preventing American military intervention in European domestic
politics. Limiting the Presidency to persons with “natural born” loyalty
exclusively to the United States was a way to mitigate conflicting
loyalties that might entangle the new nation in European wars.
D.

James Madison and the 1789 Citizenship Controversy
in the First Congress

One other key piece of evidence involving James Madison (Jay’s coauthor of The Federalist) regarding the original meaning of the Natural
Born Citizen Clause comes from Madison’s speech in the First Congress
defending the House of Representative’s decision in an early challenge
to the citizenship of one of its members. On April 29, 1789, in the
inaugural session of Congress, a specially empaneled House
Committee on Elections, rendered a decision in Ramsay v. Smith after

useful asylum for him’” and the United States may become “a safe residence for him”
(quoting Thomas Jefferson)).
160. See Office of the Historian, The United States and the French Revolution, 1789–
1799, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/french-rev (last
visited Nov. 30, 2017) (contrasting the pro-French republican group in Washington’s
Cabinet led by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson with the pro-neutrality supporters
led by Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton).
161. See Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Treaties with Franch, in 25 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1 JANUARY–10 MAY 1793 608–19 (John Catanzariti ed., 1992).
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reviewing evidence and hearing witnesses.162 The case involved a
challenge to the election of William Loughton Smith to the House as
a Representative from South Carolina.163 The challenger was David
Ramsay, a South Carolina physician, delegate to the Continental Congress
and state legislature, and a historian of repute who authored a short
“dissertation” about citizenship.164 Ramsay asserted that Smith was not
a citizen of the United States for seven years, as required by Article I.165
The facts supported Ramsay’s claim. Smith was born in 1758 in
Charleston, South Carolina, then a British colony.166 His family, a
respected clan of planters with deep roots in the colony, sent him to
schools in England from 1770 to 1774.167 He subsequently studied law
at the Middle Temple in London in 1774 and also studied in Geneva
from 1774 to 1778.168 He was a seventeen-year-old student in Geneva
when the United States declared independence in 1776.169 Smith did
not return to South Carolina until after the war in November 1783 at
the age of twenty-four, whereupon he began a law practice and entered
local politics.170 He was elected to Congress as a Federalist and began
his two-year term in the House of Representatives on March 4, 1789.171
At the time of his election, Smith had been a citizen of South Carolina
and then of the United States for between five and six years.172 But, he
had not been a citizen for the requisite seven years, unless he had
somehow been a “citizen of the United States” for at least one of the
seven years he had been abroad from 1776, when the United States
declared its independence, to 1783, when he returned to South
Carolina.173 Because Smith’s parents had apparently been Loyalists,
they had presumptively been loyal British subjects during that time—

162. Ramsay v. Smith (1789), reprinted in CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN
CONGRESS, FROM THE YEAR 1789 TO 1834, INCLUSIVE 23 (M. St. Clair Clarke & David A.
Hall eds., 1834).
163. Id. at 23.
164. See generally RAMSAY, supra note 130.
165. Ramsay v. Smith, reprinted in CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS, FROM
THE YEAR 1789 TO 1834, INCLUSIVE, supra note 162, at 23.
166. Id. at 31.
167. Id. at 24, 26, 33.
168. Id. at 26.
169. Id. at 26, 31.
170. Id. at 28.
171. Id. at 23.
172. Id. at 28.
173. Id. at 23, 32–33.

2017]

“NATURAL BORN CITIZEN”

359

an allegiance that could plausibly be imputed to their minor children.174
It was by no means easy to make the case that Smith had in fact been a
citizen of the United States for his time abroad as a minor during the war.
Nevertheless, the Committee on Elections and the full House
confirmed Smith’s election, a result that Madison defended in remarks
delivered a month later in May 1789.175 A fragment of that speech has
been plucked out and featured as evidence in chief for the view that
“natural born Citizen” in Article II means someone born in the United
States.176 But an appreciation of the context of Madison’s remarks and
Smith’s facts reveals the conclusion to be fundamentally mistaken.
Madison began by asserting “that Mr. Smith, was on the declaration
of independence, a citizen of the United States; and unless it appears
that he has forfeited his right by some neglect or overt act, he had
continued a citizen until the day of his election to a seat in this
House.”177 He observed that the question of Smith’s citizenship was a
matter of “the laws and constitution of South Carolina, so far as they
can guide us; and where the laws do not expressly guide us, we must
be guided by principles of a general nature.”178 What were these
general principles?
It is an established maxim that birth is a criterion of allegiance.
Birth, however, derives its force sometimes from place, and sometimes
from parentage; but, in general, place is the most certain criterion;
it is what applies in the United States; it will therefore be unnecessary
to investigate any other. Mr. Smith founds his claim upon his
birthright; his ancestors were among the first settlers of that colony.179

Madison asserted that Ramsay “erred” in supposing that when America
declared independence from Great Britain, a “tie of allegiance”
continued between Americans and the King.180
Madison’s reasoning to support his position is a fascinating
discourse on his, and presumably other early Americans’, views on
citizenship, political theory, and social contract theory. He began by
174. Id. at 31.
175. See id. at 33.
176. See, e.g., McManamon, supra note 7, at 330 (noting that Madison is a reliable
source of interpreting the Constitution since he helped draft the document and
construing his May 1789 speech as support for the jus soli interpretation of the Natural
Born Citizen Clause).
177. Ramsay v. Smith, reprinted in CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS, FROM
THE YEAR 1789 TO 1834, INCLUSIVE, supra note 162, at 32.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 33.
180. Id.
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distinguishing the “primary allegiance” persons owe to a “particular
society of which we are members” and “the secondary allegiance we
owe to the sovereign established by that society.”181 Thus, a South
Carolina citizen, before independence, owed a secondary allegiance to
the British King as a member of South Carolina society to which he
owed a primary allegiance. When South Carolina and the King
separated in 1776, the secondary allegiance was broken, but the
primary allegiance between the citizen and South Carolina remained.
If that primary allegiance—“the original compact, which made them
altogether one society”—had “dissolved,” then every former member
“must individually revert into a state of nature.”182 Madison did not
believe a reversion to the state of nature had occurred; rather, the
enduring society of South Carolina upon independence
“substitute[ed] a new form of Government in the place of the old
one.”183 Using this reasoning, Madison explained why Smith’s
continuing status as a citizen of South Carolina was relevant:
Mr. Smith being, then, at the declaration of independence, a minor,
but being a member of that particular society, he became, in my
opinion, bound by the decision of the society, with respect to the
question of independence and change of Government; and if afterwards
he had taken part with the enemies of his country, he would have
been guilty of treason against that Government to which he owed
allegiance, and would have been liable to be prosecuted as a traitor.184

Madison acknowledged that this would mean that all South Carolina
“natives of America,” whether children or adults or within the state or
abroad, automatically became members of the independent South
Carolina.185 Those who then made a choice to “take part with Britain,”
who were “of mature age,” and “had the power of making an option
between the contending parties” (like Smith’s parents) would thus be
guilty of “high treason” against South Carolina.186 But a minor, like
Smith made no such choice; in other words, his “primary” allegiance
to South Carolina continued and he made no affirmative choice to
abandon it. Accordingly, Madison concluded that:
So far as we can judge by the laws of Carolina, and the practice
and decision of that State, the principles I have adduced are
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 34–35.
Id.
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supported; and I must own that I feel myself at liberty to decide that
Mr. Smith was a citizen at the declaration of independence, a citizen
at the time of his election, and, consequently, entitled to a seat in
this Legislature.187

Of course, Madison’s argument importantly presumed that Smith,
by not returning to the United States or acting to advance the United
States’ interests abroad, did not affirmatively choose the British cause
between 1777 and 1783 when he was no longer a minor. But Ramsay
did not make this point and presented no evidence in the record to
suggest otherwise.
Thus, the full context of Madison’s May 1789 remarks reveals how
little they had to do with birthright citizenship, whether by place of
birth or parentage. That should be obvious from the start because,
unlike the Presidency, there is no constitutional requirement for the
kind of citizenship a member of Congress must possess, only the
condition of seven years of it.188 Accordingly, the crux of the matter
was the citizenship status of individuals who had obtained citizenship
through birth or parentage and were minors at the time of the
American declaration of independence. With respect to the nature of
birthright citizenship, Madison’s observations, as noted, were cursory
and secondary: it comes “sometimes from place, and sometimes from
parentage.”189 Place was logically the “most certain criterion,” since
there is no need to reconstruct a person’s genealogy, and, according
to Madison, “what applies in the United States.”190 This made it
unnecessary to query Smith’s birthright, since he was born in South
Carolina. Madison added, however, in a remark that would be
superfluous if jus sanguinis were entirely irrelevant, that “Mr. Smith
founds his claim upon his birthright; his ancestors were among the first
settlers of that colony.”191 This last point suggests that Madison might
have concluded that, given his parentage, Smith was an American
citizen even if he had been born outside the United States. And recall
that Madison qualified that place of birth was the criterion “in
general,” implying that it was not dispositive in all places. It is beyond
doubt, however, that since Smith was born in South Carolina,
187. Id. at 35.
188. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall
not have . . . been seven Years a Citizen of the United States . . . .”).
189. See Ramsay v. Smith, reprinted in CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS,
FROM THE YEAR 1789 TO 1834, INCLUSIVE, supra note 162, at 33 (emphasis added).
190. Id.
191. Id.
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Madison’s remarks simply cannot be construed to rule out the
possibility of American citizenship to children born to Americans
extraterritorially at or after the time of Declaration of Independence,
a factual context that was not present in the case.
In summary, Madison’s May 1789 comments in the Smith controversy
do not illuminate the Natural Born Citizen Clause in the way that some
other commentators have presumed as precluding anything but jus soli
as a natural birthright principle of citizenship in the United States, or
as a full-throated adoption of British imperial precedent.192 To the
contrary, Madison’s thinking illuminated the contractual nature of the
American conception of natural citizenship—volitional, except for
minors—and how it differed from British natural born subjectship. If
anything, then, Madison’s speech shows the fallacy of relying blindly
on the English-British example for interpretive insight into the Natural
Born Citizen Clause. That is not to say that the prior history of “natural
born subjects” in England was unimportant. Rather, it must be
examined and interpreted carefully, which I endeavor to do in Part II.
II.

ENGLISH COMMON LAW AND NATURAL BORN SUBJECTS

The foregoing discussion in Part I featured American founding
evidence directly relevant to the original meaning of “natural born
Citizen” as a condition of presidential eligibility in Article II of the
Constitution. It is plain that the answer to this narrow interpretive
question is linked to general conceptions of natural born subjectship
in England and Great Britain, and natural born citizenship in Europe
and the early United States.193 Commentators have focused most on
the English example, given the importance of English common law as
a jurisprudential source of the U.S. Constitution.194 Some of these
Anglo-centric commentators have concluded that jus soli was the sole
rule under English common law, implicitly denying the importance of

192. See McManamon, supra note 7, at 330 (arguing that Madison’s assertion that
“place is the most certain criterion” of allegiance should be taken as a reliable
interpretation of the Constitution (quoting Ramsay v. Smith, reprinted in CASES OF
CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS, FROM THE YEAR 1789 TO 1834, INCLUSIVE, supra note
162, at 33)).
193. See id. at 330 (explaining that no substantive distinction exists between “natural born
subject” and “natural born Citizen” and that the shift from the use of “subject” to “citizen” is
a result of the change from English common law to the new United States government).
194. See id. at 320 (noting that the U.S. Constitution derives important
jurisprudential phrases from English common law such as “ex post facto,” “writ of
habeas corpus,” “bill of attainder,” and “natural born Citizen”).
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jus sanguinis with respect to the special case of children of English
subjects born abroad.195 This denial of the role of jus sanguinis in
English common law, in my view, is fundamentally mistaken.
By the late eighteenth century, the common law of England
recognized both jus soli and jus sanguinis as principles of natural
birthright citizenship.196 It was true, as Chief Justice Alexander
Cockburn of Queen’s Bench observed in 1869, that the ancient
common law had recognized jus soli only:
This rule, when originally established, was not unsuited to the
isolated position of this island, and the absence of intercourse with
foreign nations in Saxon times. No children of English parents
being born abroad, or children of foreign parents being born within
the realm, the simple rule that to be born within the dominions of
the Crown constituted an Englishman answered every purpose. But
when the foreign possessions of our kings and the increase of
commerce had led to greater intercourse with the Continent, and
children of English parents were sometimes born abroad, the
inconvenience of the rule which made the place of birth the sole
criterion of nationality soon became felt.197

For the reasons Cockburn noted, starting in 1350, Parliament enacted
statutes applying jus sanguinis to children born to English subjects abroad.198
Proponents of the idea that jus soli alone was the rule at English
common law point to such statutes as evidence that jus sanguinis was
not “common law” but required Parliamentary action for activation.199
As a jurisprudential matter, this viewpoint unduly simplifies the
English understanding of lawmaking and the interaction between

195. See id. at 321 n.27, 327–28 (acknowledging that jus sanguinis had only a limited
effect since it only applied to one generation of children); see also Pryor, supra note 25,
at 886 (observing that although jus sanguinis existed, jus soli was the “guiding principle
of nationality law in England”).
196. See McManamon, supra note 7, at 321 & n.25, 327 (finding that during the
eighteenth century, jus soli standards were relaxed through the adoption of new
statutes, and England began recognizing citizenship through jus sanguinis principles).
197. COCKBURN, supra note 15, at 7 (detailing that Cockburn was himself the son of
an English envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the German Kingdom
of Wurttemberg, and so had a personal interest in the issue of a foreign-born subject’s
eligibility for high government office).
198. See A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea 1350, 25 Edw. 3 stat. 1 (Eng.).
199. See McManamon, supra note 7, at 323 n.43, 324 n.44 (denouncing the belief that
the passing of A Statute For Those Who Are Born In Parts Beyond Sea 1350 proves that jus
sanguinis was common law by pointing out that the statute’s language itself says it will apply
to children born “henceforth” and if the statute was actually common law, there would have
been no need for subsequent legislation that clarified the statute’s meaning).
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statutes and the “common law” tradition.200 Sometimes Parliament’s
statutes were seen as breaking from that tradition; at other times, they
were declaratory of it.201 Indeed, “some lawyers genuinely regarded
the acts of the medieval high court of parliament as the decisions of a
supreme court of law.”202
How, then, can we distinguish between statutes that were constitutive
of the common law and those that were not? The answer lies in the
vintage and continuity of rules declared in statutes and their
subsequent validation by courts and treatise writers. With specific
respect to English and later British “natural born” subject status, jus
sanguinis as applied to the children born abroad of the Crown’s
officials such as ambassadors, courtiers, or soldiers had been
memorialized in statutes since 1350 and had clearly congealed into
custom by the late eighteenth century.203 The same inaugural 1350
statute adopted jus sanguinis for the children of private subjects abroad
such as merchants, which had also become part of the common law.204
But, during the eighteenth century, Parliament passed new statutes
deeming foreign-born persons to be natural born subjects on the basis
of a paternal grandfather who was an Englishman,205 belief in the

200. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 169–70 (2d ed.
1979) (arguing that a static view of common law is not supported by “historical fact”
since “few legislative acts . . . could be regarded as radical departures from the
common law tradition” and that although Parliament makes new law, they “do so
within the framework of common law”).
201. See id. at 181–82 (explaining that judges had discretion to interpret common
law into Parliament’s statutes or could firmly reject Parliament’s statutes if they were
seen as “unreasonable”).
202. Id. at 170.
203. See, e.g., An Act to Naturalize the Children of such Officers and Souldiers &
Others The Natural Borne Subjects of this Realme Who Have Been Borne Abroad
During The Warr the Parents of such Children haveing Been in the Service of this
Government 1698, 9 Will. 3 c. 20 (Eng.); An Act for the Naturalizing of Children of
his Majestyes English Subjects Borne in Forreigne Countryes Dureing the Late
Troubles 1677, 29 Car. 2 c. 6 (Eng.) (extending jus sanguinis principles to foreign-born
children of royalist retainers); A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea
1350, 25 Edw. 3 stat. 1 (Eng.) (declaring that certain children who were born abroad
would have the same inheritance rights as children born “within the same Ligeance”).
204. See A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea 1350, 25 Edw. 3 stat.
1 (Eng.) (“And that all Children Inheritors, which from henceforth shall be born
without the Ligeance of the King, whose Fathers and Mothers at the Time of their
Birth be and shall be at the Faith and Ligeance of the King of England, shall have and
enjoy the same Benefits and Advantages . . . .”).
205. See The British Nationality Act 1772, 13 Geo. 3, c. 21 (Eng.).
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Protestant religion,206 or service on British warships or merchantmen,
or whaleboats.207 These newer more experimental statutes had not
become part of the common law; indeed, one such nouveau statute was
hastily repealed.208
Where, then, did the notion that English common law was limited
solely to jus soli four centuries after the first jus sanguinis statute was
enacted in 1350 come from? The conventional (and mistaken)
perception is that it originated in the iconic 1608 decision in Calvin’s
Case.209 The case involved the property, inheritance, and litigation
rights in England of persons born in Scotland after King James VI of
Scotland acceded to the English throne as James I in 1603.210 The issue
was deemed important enough that all fourteen judges of the three
common law courts—Court of Common Pleas, King’s Bench, and the
Court of the Exchequer—were mustered to hear it.211 The most
famous of the judges was Sir Edward Coke, who was Chief Justice of
Common Pleas at the time.212
The central holding in Calvin’s Case was that a subject owed
allegiance to the King who is sovereign of the land into which the
subject was born.213 Accordingly, a person born in Scotland after James
acceded to the English throne was also a natural born subject under
English law. Such a person, a postnatus (“born after”) like Calvin,214
could consequently own property in England, inherit property, and

206. See The Foreign Protestants Naturalization Act 1708, 7 Ann., c. 5 (Eng.),
repealed by An Act To Repeal the Act of the Seventh Year of Her Majesties Reign
Intituled An Act for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants 1711, 10 Ann., c. 9 (Eng.).
207. See An Act for the Further Encouragement and Enlargement of the Whale
Fishery, and for Continuing such Laws as are therein Mentioned Relating Thereto;
and for the Naturalization of Such Foreign Protestants, as Shall Serve for the Time
Therein Mentioned, on Board Such Ships as Shall be Fitted out for the Said Fishery
1749, 22 Geo. 2, c. 45. (Eng.).
208. See 10 Ann., c. 9 (Eng.) (repealing 7 Ann., c. 5 (Eng.)).
209. See Calvin v. Smith (Calvin’s Case), 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608).
210. Id. at 379.
211. See Price, supra note 19, at 82.
212. See id. at 74, 83 (calling Coke’s analysis of the case “the most influential” and
“one of the most important English common-law decisions adopted by courts in the
early history of the United States”).
213. See Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 409 (“[A]ll those that were born under one
natural obedience while the realms were united under one sovereign, should remain
natural born subjects, and no aliens; for that naturalization due and vested by
birthright, cannot by any separation of the Crowns afterward be taken away: nor he
that was by judgment of law a natural subject at the time of his birth . . . .”).
214. Calvin’s real surname was Colville. See Price, supra note 19, at 81.
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sue or be sued in the English courts. By the same token, the judges
proclaimed that someone who was born in Scotland before James
became king of England, an antenatus (“born before”), could not own
property, inherit it, and sue or be sued in the English courts.215 In
Coke’s own words, a rule of allegiance by place of birth was not only a
“part of the law of England,” but it was also “jura natura” (natural laws),
the “law of Nature,” and the “eternal law of the Creator.”216 Thus, the
question whether jus sanguinis, the other great principle of birthright
jura natura, operated with respect to children born to Englishmen
outside of England did not come up at all in Calvin’s Case.217
Nonetheless, what has led scholars to conclude that jus sanguinis is
not a part of the common law, even as to the foreign-born children of
English subjects, was the enactment of statutes to confirm the “natural
born subject” status of children born outside the realm, beginning with
the aforementioned statutes passed in 1350.218 If jus sanguinis was also
part of the common law of England and would have been recognized
by the common law courts, then why were the statutes necessary? In
part, as noted above, they were necessary because the common law
judges did not rule on jus sanguinis in Calvin’s Case or any other case
of the era. Indeed, Calvin’s Case was litigated in the courts in the first
place because Parliament had refused to enact a statute giving the
postnati (and the antenati) rights to hold property in England and to
sue and be sued in English courts.219 Ironically, if Parliament had
enacted such a statute, Calvin’s Case would never have been decided,
and jus soli and jus sanguinis would have stood on the same footing in
England, both having been implemented by statutes. Modern
commentators would then have easily understood that both natural law
principles were equally the common law of England.

215. Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 391–92.
216. Id.; see Price, supra note 19, at 74 (emphasizing that the “law of nature” and
thus “the eternal law of the Creator” required the Calvin’s Case judges to hold that
place of birth determined one’s status).
217. Colville’s father, an early supporter of James VI, was a Scotsman, not an Englishman.
218. See A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea 1350, 25 Edw. 3 stat.
1 (Eng.); see also McManamon, supra note 7, at 321 n.27, 327–28 (acknowledging that
jus sanguinis had a limited effect since it only applied to one generation of children);
Pryor, supra note 25, at 886 (finding that although jus sanguinis existed, jus soli was the
“guiding principle of nationality law in England”).
219. See Price, supra note 19, at 85 (noting that the underlying legal question of
Calvin’s Case concerned “an unsettled theory of sovereignty under which the question
of who is a subject and who is an alien had to be reconciled”).
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Instead, Parliament continued, in the absence of an iconic decision
like Calvin’s Case to that effect, to enact jus sanguinis statutes to ensure
that courts would recognize the subject status of English children born
abroad in lawsuits that came before them.220 The statutes were,
accordingly, not creative of a new category of birthright subject status.
Rather, they were confirmative, but passed on the suspicion that the
common law courts would be unduly favorable to jus soli and hostile to
foreign-born descendants in cases before them.221 This fear was
exacerbated after Henry VIII’s split from Rome and establishment of
the Church of England, and resultant paranoia of foreign Catholic
intrigues.222 For this reason, starting in the mid-sixteenth century, some
Protestant English subjects sought and obtained private bills of
naturalization for their foreign-born children because they were doubtful
that the courts would honor natural law and the general statutes.223
A.

Natural Born Subject Statutes

What were the defining characteristics of these English statutes
extending subject status to persons who could not benefit from jus soli
by virtue of having been born in England? To start with, there were a
great number of them: I have found nearly a hundred statutes
referencing “natural born subjects,” most of them passed in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Not all the “natural born
subject” laws implemented jus sanguinis, as we shall see. The basic
structure of the statutes of greatest interest for present purposes was to
“esteem,” “deem,” “adjudge,” “take,” or “hold” certain persons or

220. See id. at 77–78 (“[E]ven before Calvin’s Case, various acts and proclamations
provided that a child born out of the territory of England could also be a natural-born
subject . . . . In the history of both Britain and the United States, the jus sanguinis has
always been established by statute, never by judge-made law.”).
221. See John W. Salmond, Citizenship and Allegiance: Nationality in English Law, 18
LAW Q. REV. 49, 53 (1902) (discussing the shift in emphasis from jus sanguinis to jus soli
in feudal English law).
222. See J.J. SCARISBRICK, HENRY VIII 392 (Yale Univ. Press 1997) (1969) (describing
Henry VIII’s efforts to eradicate the papist influence in England).
223. See, e.g., The Titles of the Private Acts 1695–1696, 7 & 8 Will. 3 (Eng.) (listing
“Private Acts” enacted in 1695 and 1696 “for the naturalization” of named persons);
see also McManamon, supra note 7, at 348–58 (providing a partial list of naturalized
Children who were born abroad to English parents between 1509 and 1800). It
appears that most of the commoner children naturalized were born to Englishmen
with foreign wives. There were several children born to English noblewomen, likely
in service at the court when William and Mary held court in Holland. See infra note
244 and accompanying text.
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groups of persons born outside of England to be “natural born
subjects,” sometimes subject to conditions. The chief aim of these
statutes seems to have been to ensure that those declared natural born
subjects were granted the same rights as those born within England
with respect to the rights to inherit, hold property, and sue. This was
a particularly sensitive issue for Norman and other foreign-origin
nobles (e.g., Dutch, German) in medieval and early modern England
with deep ties to the continent, many of whom were also engaged in
the King’s or Queen’s military campaigns there. Indeed, a central
focus of statutes from the fourteenth through the seventeenth
centuries was to clear up the inheritance rights of knights and courtiers
serving the king outside of England who might have children born
while abroad.224 The inheritance rights of these children might be
prejudiced vis-à-vis children of the same parents born in England,
should the latter contest them in the king’s courts.
The first and most famous of these statutes, De Natis Ultra Mare (“On
Those Born Beyond the Sea”) was enacted by Parliament during the
reign of King Edward III in 1350.225 This monumental and ancient
statute, was cited repeatedly and with approval by the common law
judges in Calvin’s Case. Ultra Mare did not use the precise words
“natural born subject,” but conveyed the same concept by confirming
that certain foreign-born children had the same inheritance rights “as
those . . . born within the same Ligeance” of England.226 The seed of
the statute was planted in 1343 when questions were raised regarding
the inheritance right of the king’s sons born outside of England.227
The Chamber of Lords unanimously opined that they could but admitted
doubt as to the right to inherit of the foreign-born children of English
subjects.228 The Chamber of Commons agreed, but the matter was
deferred for deliberation.229 The Black Plague occasioned more delay;
De Natis Ultra Mare was ultimately enacted seven years later.230
The statute began by explaining why it was enacted: “[O]ur Lord
the King, willing that all Doubts and Ambiguities” regarding “if the
Children born in the Parts beyond the Sea, out of the Ligeance of
224. See J. GRAHAM JONES, THE HISTORY OF WALES 19–21 (2014) (explaining the
order of rights to inheritance).
225. A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea 1350, 25 Edw. 3 stat. 1 (Eng.).
226. Id.
227. See COCKBURN, supra note 15, at 7–8.
228. See id. at 8.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 7–8.
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England, should be able to demand any Inheritance within the same
Ligeance.”231 It stated that “the Law of the Crown of England is, and
always hath been such, that the Children of the Kings of England, in
whatsoever Parts they shall be born, in England or elsewhere, be able
and ought to bear the Inheritance after the Death of their
Ancestors.”232 The statute then declared that two named sons and one
named daughter of three English barons,
and other which the King will name, which were born beyond the Sea,
out of the Ligeance of England, shall be from henceforth able to have
and enjoy their Inheritance after the death of their Ancestors, in all
Parts within the Ligeance of England, as well as those that should be
born within the same Ligeance.233

The three named nobles, the Second Baron de Beaumont, the First
Baron de Bryan, and the Second Baron D’Aubigny, were renowned
knights. It is unsurprising that the King and Parliament sought to
protect the inheritance rights of children whom these loyal soldiers
might have fathered while resting between battles fought on his behalf
abroad.234
The next part of the statute applied to commoners and declared that:
[A]ll Children Inheritors, which from henceforth shall be born
without the Ligeance of the King, whose Fathers and Mothers at the
Time of their Birth be and shall be at the Faith and Ligeance of the
King of England, shall have and enjoy the same Benefits and
Advantages, to have and bear the Inheritance within the same
Ligeance, as the other Inheritors aforesaid in Time to come; so
always, that the Mothers of such Children do pass the Sea by the
Licence and Wills of their Husbands.235

231. A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea 1350, 25 Edw. 3 stat. 1 (Eng.).
232. Id.
233. Id. The children granted citizenship by name were Henry, the son of the
Second Baron John de Beaumont; Elisabeth, daughter of the First Baron Guy de
Bryan; and Giles, son of the Second Baron Ralph D’Aubigny. Id.
234. The statute made a special provision for illegitimate children, which tends to
support the conclusion that the intended noble beneficiaries of the law were soldiers
on campaign:
And if it be alledged against any such born beyond the Sea, that he is a Bastard,
in case where the Bishop ought to have Cognisance of Bastardy, it shall be
commanded to the Bishop of the Place where the Demand is, to certify the
King’s Court where the Plea thereof hangeth, as of old Times hath been used
in the Case of Bastardy alledged against them which were born in England.
Id.
235. Id. The commoners’ part of the statute states that it applies to children “born
without the Ligeance of the King” rather than children “born in the Parts beyond the
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Unlike the statutory provision as to nobles, the commoners’
provision required both “Fathers and Mothers” to be subjects of the
King. Nor did it extend to a child born of a mother abroad who did not
go there with her husband’s permission. As such, the statute reflected a
gender skew that English, American, and European jus sanguinis laws
would exhibit until the mid-nineteenth century, well after the Natural
Born Clause was adopted.236 More fundamentally, the reason for
extending inheritance rights to the foreign-born children of commoners
was, as Justice Cockburn noted, to facilitate foreign commerce, not to
reward and protect loyal service to the King as with knights of the
realm.237 The absence of reference to such rules as perpetual (i.e., “the
Law of the Crown of England always”) supports the plausible inference
that both rules as to the foreign-born children of Englishman nobles and
commoners was of more recent provenance in 1350.
The history of English “natural born subject” statutes enacted after
De Natis Ultra Mare reflected the twists and turns of English history in
subsequent centuries. As noted above, anti-Catholic sentiment in the
late sixteenth and early mid-seventeenth centuries triggered clouds of
suspicion over English subjects who spent long periods of time abroad,
particularly in Catholic kingdoms or jurisdictions.238 The English civil
wars, however, resulted in large numbers of English royalists who went
into exile abroad (including Charles II himself) for sustained periods
of time, during which many had children.239 After Charles II returned
to England in 1660 and the monarchy was restored, Parliament passed
a statute in 1677 recognizing the inheritance rights of children born
to royalist retainers abroad.240 The statute used the words “Naturall
borne Subjects” with regard to the children of subjects who “did . . . by
reason of their attendance upon his Majestie or for feare of the then
Sea, out of the Ligeance of England” like the nobles’ part. Id. The difference in
phraseology seems to be shorthand, not an intentional differentiation.
236. See generally RUTH DONNER, THE REGULATION OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 32 (2d ed. 1994) (“Another mode of acquiring nationality at birth by direct
operation of law was by descent, according to the nationality of one, or both, of the
parents, usually of the father alone . . . .”).
237. See COCKBURN, supra note 15, at 7–8.
238. See Harvey Couch, The Evolution of Parliamentary Divorce in England, 52 TUL. L.
REV. 513, 522 n.51 (1978) (noting that “[l]aws against Catholics and feelings against
Catholicism” pervaded England in the 17th century).
239. P. H. Hardacre, The Royalists in Exile During the Puritan Revolution, 1642–1660,
16 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 353, 353–54, 362 (1953).
240. See An Act for Naturalizing of Children of His Majestyes English Subjects Borne
in Forreigne Countryes Dureing the Late Troubles 1677, 29 Car. 2 c. 6 (Eng.).
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Usurped Powers reside in parts beyond the Seas out of his Majestyes
Dominions.”241 It provided that any person who, between June 14,
1641, and March 20, 1660, was
borne out of his Majestyes Dominions and whose Fathers or Mothers
were Naturall borne Subjects of the Realme are hereby declared and shall
for ever be esteemed and taken to all Intents and Purposes to be and to
have beene the Kings Naturall borne Subjects . . . shall be adjudged
reputed and taken to be and to have beene in every respect and degree
Naturall borne Subjects and free to all intents purposes and constructions
as if they and every of them had beene borne in England.242

The 1677 statute is the first one to use the phrase “natural born
subjects” and merits sustained reflection. First, it was limited in explicit
terms and effect to royalist nobles who had stayed loyal to Charles II,
even to the point of leaving their homes in England to go into exile
with him. The underlying rationale was to reward and protect loyal
servants of the Crown, akin to the barons’ provision of De Natis Ultra
Mare enacted three centuries earlier.243
Second, unlike the
commoners’ prong of Ultra Mare, the statute applied to children born
to “Fathers or Mothers” in “attendance upon his Majestie.”244 Presumably,
there were ladies-in-waiting among the courtiers who had followed
Charles II, and their children were explicitly covered. Third, it is easy
to comprehend the special circumstances that gave rise to the felt need
for the retroactive enactment. The statute was one part of a bundle of
legislative efforts to restore the rights of returned Royalists who had in
many cases been absent from the realm for as long as nineteen years.245
As such, there would have been legitimate doubts about the loyalty of
their children, even if the rule of jus sanguinis, as applied to the
foreign-born children of public servants, had been absorbed into the
common law during the 327 years since De Natis Ultra Mare.
The next great event in English political history was the “Glorious
Revolution” of 1688 to 1689, when the Dutch prince William of Orange
and his English wife Mary assumed the British crown jointly as William

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text (discussing De Natis Ultra Mare
provisions).
244. 29 Car. 2 c. 6 (Eng.).
245. See id. (specifying children born outside of “his Majestyes Dominions” between
June, 14, 1641 and March 24, 1660).
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III and Mary II.246 Even after he became King of England, William
spent considerable time outside England on military campaigns,
mostly in France and Ireland.247 Mary herself returned to England in
January 1689, a few months after William’s bloodless invasion, and
ruled alone when her husband was abroad fighting.248 These were the
circumstances behind the enactment of a “natural born subject”
statute in 1697 entitled: “An Act to Naturalize the Children of such
Officers and Souldiers & Others the Natural Borne Subjects of This
Realme Who Have Been Borne Abroad During the Warr the Parents
of Such Children Haveing Been in the Service of This Government.”249
The statute noted that
dureing the late Warr with France divers of His Majesty’s good and
lawfull Subjects . . . did by reason of their Attendance on His Majesty
in Flanders and bearing Armes under His said Majesty against the
French King and other His Majesties Enemies reside in Parts beyond
the Seas out of his Majesties Dominions.250

“[D]ivers Children” had been born to these “good and lawfull
Subjects” during their government service abroad who, “by reason of
their being borne” outside England “may be interpreted to be
incapable of taking receiving or enjoying any Mannors and Lands or
any other Privileges and Immunities belonging to the liege People and
natural borne Subjects of his Kingdome.”251 Taking its lead from the
1677 statute, Parliament provided that persons who, between February
13, 1688 and March 25, 1698,
are or shall be borne out of His Majesties Dominions and whose
Fathers or Mothers were natural borne Subjects of this Realme and
were then actually in the Service of His Majesty or of His Majesty and
the late Queen of Blessed Memory are hereby declared and shall
forever be esteemed and taken to all Intents & Purposes to be and
to have been the Kings natural borne Subjects of this Kingdome and
that the said Children . . . and every of them are and shall be

246. See STEVE PINCUS, 1688: THE FIRST MODERN REVOLUTION 285 (2009) (“[O]n 6
February,[ 1689,] the House of Lords agreed that James II had abdicated . . . . They
then agreed to have William and Mary declared king and queen of England.”).
247. Id. at 298, 339 (describing “William’s departure to fight in Ireland” and his
“war against France”).
248. Richard Price, An Incomparable Lady: Queen Mary II’s Share in the Government of
England, 1689–94, 75 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 307, 307–08 (2012) (detailing the Queen’s
appointment to sole royal authority during William II’s absence in 1689).
249. 1697, 9 Will. 3 c. 20 (Eng.).
250. Id.
251. Id.
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adjudged reputed and taken to be in every respect and degree natural
borne Subjects and free to all Intents Purposes & Constructions as if
they & every of them had been borne in England.252

Again, like the 1677 statute, the 1698 statute was limited to the
children of loyal subjects who were abroad “in the Service of this
Government.”253 It too applied to government servants who were
either “Fathers or Mothers,” the latter presumably referring to ladiesin-waiting who had served Queen Mary in the Netherlands in 1688
before she had returned to England.254 Finally, commoners were
unmentioned as in the 1677 statute, by contrast to De Natis Ultra Mare.
Another statute enacted during the reign of William III as part of
the 1700 Act of Settlement blocked any person “born out of the
Kingdoms of England Scotland or Ireland” from government or
military office, positions of trust, or crown grants.255 It provided that
no Person born out of the Kingdoms of England Scotland or Ireland or
the Dominions thereunto belonging (although he be naturalized or
made a Denizen (except such as are born of English Parents) shall be
capable to be of the Privy Councill or a Member of either House of
Parliament or to enjoy any Office or Place of Trust either Civill or
Military or to have any Grant of Lands Tenements or Hereditaments
from the Crown to himself or to any other or others in Trust for him.256

The statute explicitly carved out from the restriction on government
service any person “such as are born of English Parents.”257 It was likely
enacted to close off the prospect that the new royal House of Hanover
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See LISA JARDINE, TEMPTATION IN THE ARCHIVES: ESSAYS IN GOLDEN AGE DUTCH
CULTURE 21 (2015) (summarizing a royal servant’s account of Princess Mary’s
departure from the Netherlands on February 5, 1689).
255. The Act of Settlement 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3 c. 2, § 3 (Eng.). The Short Titles
Act of 1896, 59 & 60 Vict. c. 14 (Eng.), did not assign the Act of Settlement a year, but,
under the official Parliamentary convention of dating a statute according to the year
the originating Parliamentary session commenced, the Act should be dated as 1700.
However, it is also commonly referred to as the 1701 Act of Settlement, because that
was the year Parliament enacted it. Because William and Mary had no surviving heirs,
the Act of Settlement provided for succession to the Irish and English thrones to the
lawful descendants of Sophia of Hanover in modern-day Germany, a granddaughter
of James I. Id. Sophia and the House of Hanover were Protestants, by contrast to the
Catholic sympathies of the claimants to the thrones in the House of Stuart. See A. W.
Ward, The Electress Sophia and the Hanoverian Succession, 1 ENG. HIST. REV. 470, 477
(1886) (detailing a Hanoverian historian’s description of Sophia as “a staunch
protestant”).
256. 12 & 13 Will. 3 c. 2, § 3.
257. Id.
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would import German advisers to displace English ministers and
officers.258 Michael Ramsey has suggested that this provision may have
been “the original English precedent” for the Natural Born Citizen
Clause.259 There is no evidence for the surmise, although it strikes me
as plausible enough given that the Act of Settlement was a prominent
enactment of which the early Americans were surely aware. If Ramsey
is right, then it is yet more evidence that the Natural Born Citizen
Clause does incorporate jus sanguinis, given the explicit carve-out for
foreign-born children with English parents.
To summarize the state of English law at the start of the eighteenth
century, several statutes declared that children born outside England
to English subjects in government service were deemed “natural born
subjects” or entitled to the same inheritance rights as persons born
within the realm. This applied regardless of whether the parent in
service was a father (e.g., a knight in Edward III’s army or a courtier to
Charles II in exile) or mother (e.g., a lady in waiting to Queen Mary).260
Such persons were unencumbered in their right to occupy any position
open to subjects in the government and to the Crown’s largesse.
Second, De Natis Ultra Mare also granted inheritance rights to the
foreign-born children of private English commoners like merchants to
promote foreign commerce.261 Both parents had to be English
subjects.262 The seventeenth century “natural born subject” statutes,
cued to royal retainers exiled or campaigning abroad, did not replicate
Ultra Mare’s extension to commoners; that would change in the
eighteenth century.263 Regardless, De Natis Ultra Mare, a great and
258. See I. Naamani Tarkow, The Significance of the Act of Settlement in the Evolution of
English Democracy, 58 POL. SCI. Q. 537, 542, 551 (1943) (discussing the theory that “the
English Crown was offered to the House of Hanover on condition that whosoever
accepted it should not at the same time hold any German dominions”).
259. See Ramsey, supra note 24, at (manuscript at 18).
260. See supra note 244, 254 and accompanying text.
261. A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea 1350, 25 Edw. 3 stat. 1 (Eng.).
262. See id. (requiring that any children granted inheritance rights must be those
“whose Fathers and Mothers at the Time of their Birth be and shall be at the Faith and
Ligeance of the King of England”).
263. Compare An Act to Naturalize the Children of such Officers and Souldiers &
Others the Natural Borne Subjects of This Realme Who Have Been Borne Abroad
During the Warr the Parents of Such Children Haveing Been in the Service of This
Government 1698, 9 Will. 3 c. 20, § 1 (Eng.) (conferring natural born subject status
on children “whose Fathers or Mothers were natural borne Subjects of this Realme
and were then actually in the Service of His Majesty or of His Majesty and the late
Queen of blessed Memory”), with An Act for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants 1708, 7
Ann. c. 5 (Eng.) (extending the scope of naturalization to “the Children of all natural
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famous statute enacted in 1350 during the fifty-year reign of one of
England’s greatest kings, Edward III, cast its centuries-old shadow over
the enactments of all subsequent Parliaments.
The eighteenth century witnessed dynamic evolution in the jus
sanguinis principle in England and Europe. Change followed the rise
of a global economy and the ideology of mercantilism. The
conventional wisdom of the time was that a country’s strength was
measured by its population, its armies and navies, and its gold.264
Accordingly, European monarchies raced to build empires and to swell
the ranks of those they called subjects.
The laws of the British Empire, in particular, underwent a seismic
shift from a closed membership approach, anchored in insularity, to a
more open-ended one, suited to a mercantilist empire (with the
exception of Catholics). For example, some British statutes took jus
soli or jus sanguinis to new levels, as detailed below. One 1740 jus soli
statute granted “natural born subject” status to foreign Protestants,
Quakers, or Jews who had lived in the American colonies for seven
years.265 Parliament also stretched jus sanguinis beyond parentage to
second-generation ancestry in a 1772 statute deeming any child born
abroad with an English paternal grandfather a “natural born subject.”266
Indeed, some innovative British statutes in this era of high
mercantilism declared persons to be “deemed . . . and taken to be”
natural born subjects on principles other than jus soli or jus sanguinis,
such as co-religionists without any residence requirement,267 hardship
service aboard warships,268 merchant ships in wartime,269 or on whaling

born Subjects”), repealed by An Act to Repeal the Act of the Seventh Year Her Majesties
Reign Intituled An Act for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants 1711, 10 Ann. c. 9 (Eng.).
264. See D. C. Coleman, Mercantilism Revisited, 23 HIST. J. 773, 775 (1980)
(articulating the commonly held belief that “gold and silver constituted wealth and a
favourable balance of trade was the national means to acquire that wealth”).
265. See An Act for Naturalizing Such Foreign Protestants, and Others Therein
Mentioned, As Are Settled or Shall Settle, in Any of His Majesty’s Colonies in America
1740, 13 Geo. 2 c. 7 (Eng.).
266. See The British Nationality Act, 1772, 13 Geo. 3 c. 21 (Eng.).
267. See 7 Ann. c. 5.
268. An Act for the Encouragement of Trade to America 1707, 6 Ann. c. 64, § 20
(Eng.) (naturalizing foreign seamen serving as privateers, on warships, or on merchant
ships during Queen Anne’s War).
269. An Act for the Better Supply of Mariners and Seamen to Serve in His Majesty’s
Ships of War, and On Board Merchant Ships, and Other Trading Ships, and Privateers
1739, 13 Geo. 2 c. 3 (Eng.).
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boats.270 These statutes, applying what might be called the principles
of jus religionis (“right of religion”) and cuius regio, eijus religio (“whose
realm, his religion”); and jus muneris (“right of service”), were plainly
departures from natural law, and accordingly never incorporated into
English common law.271 As such, statutes awarding “natural born
subject” status based on something other than the natural law
birthrights of territory or parentage typically required oaths or
declarations of loyalty and were constrained by statutory limitations on
holding political or military office.272
Despite these innovations, jus sanguinis in the eighteenth century
never evolved to encompass natural birthright subjectship or
citizenship through the mother where her allegiance differed from the
father’s, whether in England, continental Europe, or the United
States. European and American society in 1787 to 1789 was extremely
sexist by modern standards. People believed that a child inherited a
father’s allegiance and political ties, not the mother’s. The idea that
citizen or subject status could be derived by matrilineal descent did not
gain a foothold until 1844 in Victorian England.
The first of a series of eighteenth century “natural born subject”
statutes was passed in 1708.273 The preamble nakedly asserted its
mercantilist aim: “Whereas the Increase of People is a Means of
advancing the Wealth and Strength of a Nation.”274 Parliament
declared that “the Children of all natural born Subjects born out of

270. An Act for the Further Encouragement and Enlargement of the Whale Fishery,
and for Continuing Such Laws as Are Therein Mentioned Relating Thereto; and for
the Naturalization of Such Foreign Protestants, as Shall Serve for the Time Therein
Mentioned, on Board Such Ships as Shall be Fitted Out for the Said Fishery 1749, 22
Geo. 2 c. 45, § 8 (Eng.).
271. Parliament repealed the Foreign Protestants Naturalization Act of 1708 in
1711. See KETTNER, supra note 12, at 72 (detailing the repeal of the general
naturalization act by the Tories after they captured a majority in Parliament in the
1710 elections).
272. See, e.g., An Act for Naturalizing Such Foreign Protestants, and Others Therein
Mentioned, As Are Settled or Shall Settle, in Any of His Majesty’s Colonies in America
1740, 13 Geo. 2 c. 7 (Eng.) (requiring all persons born in “His Majesty’s Colonies in
America” to “take and subscribe the Oaths” for naturalization); 13 Geo. 2 c. 3, § 3
(clarifying that “no Person who shall be naturalized by virtue of this Act, shall thereby
be enabled to be of the Privy Council, or a Member of either House of Parliament, or
to take any Office or Place of Trust, either civil or military”).
273. The Foreign Protestants Naturalization Act 1708, 7 Ann. c. 5 (Eng.), repealed by
An Act to Repeal the Act of the Seventh Year of Her Majesties Reign Intituled An Act
for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants 1711, 10 Ann. c. 9 (Eng.).
274. Id.
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the Ligeance of her Majesty Her Heires and Successors shall be
deemed adjudged and taken to be natural born Subjects of this
Kingdom to all Intents Constructions and Purposes whatsoever.”275 A
hyper-mercantilist part of the Act went even further, in the hope that
foreign Protestants “would be induced to transport themselves and
their Estates into this Kingdom.”276 They would be deemed “naturalborn Subjects” upon taking oaths of loyalty and the sacrament of the
Holy Supper to join the Church of England.277 This provision was
promptly repealed by 1711.278
The 1708 statute differed in one significant detail from the 1350 De
Natis Ultra Mare, the only predecessor statute extending jus sanguinis to
the children of parents who were not abroad in government service or
because of support for the Crown. It was ambiguous whether both
father and mother had to be English subjects, or just one parent; Ultra
Mare had plainly required both parents to be English.279 Parliament
passed a statute two decades later to “explain” away the ambiguity:
[A]ll Children born out of the Ligenace of the crown of England, or
of Great Britain, or which shall hereafter be born out of such
Ligeance, whose Fathers were or shall be natural-born Subjects of
the Crown of England, or of Great Britain, at the Time of the Birth of
such Children respectively, shall and may . . . be adjudged and taken
to be, and all such Children are hereby declared to be natural-born
Subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, to all Intents, Constructions
and Purposes whatsoever.280

Thus, the 1730 clarification confirmed that the 1708 statute had
relaxed the two-parent jus sanguinis rule for commoners of De Natis
Ultra Mare in 1350 to a requirement that only the father had to be a
natural born subject for a child born abroad to be “adjudged,” a
natural born subject “to all Intents, Constructions and Purposes

275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See 10 Ann. c. 9.
279. Compare 7 Ann. c. 5, § 3 (“And be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid,
That the Children of all natural-born Subjects born out of the Ligeance of her Majesty,
her Heirs and Successors, shall be . . . natural-born Subjects of this kingdom.”), with
A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea 1350, 25 Edw. 3 stat. 1 (Eng.)
(“And that all Children Inheritors, . . . whose Father and Mothers at the Time of their
Birth be and shall be at the Faith and Ligeance of the King of England, shall have and
enjoy the same Benefits and Advantages . . . .”).
280. The British Nationality Act, 1730, 4 Geo. 2 c. 21, § 1 (Eng.).
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whatsoever.”281 The 1730 statute further specified that neither it nor
the 1708 Act “did, doth or shall extend, or ought to be construed,
adjudged or taken to extend, to make” any such children natural-born
subjects whose fathers were “attainted of High Treason” or “were or
shall be in the actual Service of any foreign Prince or State then in
Enmity with the Crown.”282 The 1708 statute, as clarified by the 1730
statute, marked the extent of statutory definition of “natural burn
subject” that was incorporated into English common law by the time
of the American founding. The relevant rules dated back to 1350, with
the only significant modification being the relaxation of the parentage
rule for subjects born abroad to English father only, as opposed to both
parents. In my view, it is this state of play—natural born status to
children born abroad to government servants of fathers—that
informed the jus sanguinis part of the “natural born Citizen”
requirement in Article II of the U.S. Constitution.
The next four decades witnessed a series of statutes enacted by
Parliament extending natural born subject status to groups based on
new theories, in the spirit of the co-religionist statute enacted and
quickly repealed during Queen Anne’s reign. In 1739, Parliament
passed “An Act for Naturalizing Such Foreign Protestants, and Others
Therein Mentioned, as Are Settled, or Shall Settle, in Any of His
Majesty’s Colonies in America.”283 The aim was so that “many
Foreigners and Strangers from the Lenity of our Government, the
Purity of our Religion, the Benefit of our Laws, the Advantages of our
Trade, and the Security of our Property, might be induced to come
and settle in some of his Majesty’s Colonies in America.”284 The statute
provided that Protestants who had lived for seven years in the
colonies—with no absence of more than two months at one time—who
swore loyalty oaths to the Crown and took the Sacrament of the Holy
Supper; Quakers who met the residence requirements and subscribed
to a Declaration of Fidelity; and Jews who met the residency
requirements and took the Oaths omitting some Christian expressions,

281. Id.
282. Id. § 2. An exception to the exception was made for, among others, “any Child”
of a treasonous Father who “professed the Protestant religion” and had resided in
Great Britain or Ireland “for the Space of two Years” between the enactments of the
1708 and 1730 statutes, or had possessed, received, sold, or settled “any Lands,
Tenements or Hereditaments” within Great Britain or Ireland during the same period.
Id. § III.
283. 1739, 13 Geo. 2 c. 7 (Eng.).
284. Id. § 1.
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“shall be deemed, adjudged, and taken to be, his Majesty’s naturalborn Subjects of this Kingdom, to all Intents, Constructions, and
Purposes, as if they, and every of them, had been or were born within
this Kingdom.”285 The Act contained no limitation on where the
relevant natural born subjects were born or who their parents were,
thus going far beyond the jus soli and jus sanguinis principles. However,
the statute did contain the same exclusion from government offices set
forth in the 1700 Act of Settlement vis-à-vis persons not born to English
subjects. Parliament enacted a statute in 1747 extending the terms of
the 1739 statute.286
Starting with a statute in 1707 during Queen Anne’s War, the
eighteenth-century Parliament also enacted a slew of statutes
extending natural born subject status to foreigners who served in the
British military, navy, or in other hazardous or hardship duties.287 All
of the statutes required oaths of loyalty and came with the formulae of
restrictions on government service and crown largesse featured in the
1700 Act of Settlement.288 The 1707 statute extended natural born subject
status to foreign seamen who served for at least two years aboard British
warships, privateers, or merchantmen during wartime.289 A 1749 law
extended the proffer of jus muneris like the 1707 statute but with
respect to seamen who had served for three years on whaleboats, not
warships.290 A 1761 statute offered natural born subject status to “all
such foreign Protestants, as well Officers as Soldiers, who have served,

285. Id.
286. An Act to Extend the Provisions of an Act Made in the Thirteenth Year of His
Present Majesty’s Reign, Intituled, An Act for Naturalizing Such Foreign Protestants, and
Others Therein Mentioned, as Are Settled or Shall Settle in Any of His Majesty’s Colonies in
America, to Other Foreign Protestants Who Conscientiously Scruple the Taking of an
Oath 1747, 20 Geo. 2 c. 44 (Eng.).
287. See, e.g., An Act for the Further Encouragement and Enlargement of the Whale
Fishery, and for Continuing Such Laws as Are Therein Mentioned Relating Thereto;
and for the Naturalization of Such Foreign Protestants, as Shall Serve for the Time
Therein Mentioned, on Board Such Ships as Shall be Fitted Out for the Said Fishery
1749, 22 Geo. 2 c. 45, § 8 (Eng.) (extending natural born subject status to foreign
Protestants who serve aboard English whaling ships for at least three years); An Act for
the Encouragement of the Trade to America 1707, 6 Ann. c. 36, § 20 (Eng.) (extending
natural born subject status to mariners and seamen who served on English warships or
merchant ships in wartime for two years).
288. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
289. 6 Ann. c. 36, § 20.
290. 22 Geo. 2 c. 45, § 8.
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or shall hereafter serve, in the Royal American Regiment, or as
Engineers in America, for the Space of Two Years.”291
Yet another variety of experimentation was a 1772 statute extending
jus sanguinis to a second generation by making natural born subjectship available to the grandchildren of Englishmen who were
Protestants.292 Parliament made clear its mercantilist aim:
Whereas divers natural born Subjects of Great Britain who profess
and exercise the Protestant Religion, through various lawful Causes,
especially for the better carrying on of Commerce, have been, and
are obliged to reside in several trading Cities and other Foreign
Places, where they have contracted Marriages and brought up
Families: And whereas it is equally just and expedient that the
Kingdom should not be deprived of such Subjects, nor lose the
Benefit of the Wealth that they have acquired; and therefore that
not only the Children of such natural born Subjects, but their
Children also, should continue under the Allegiance of His Majesty,
and be intituled to come into this Kingdom, and to bring hither and
realize, or otherwise employ, their Capital . . . .293

The statute then incorporated by reference the 1708 statute as
“explained” by the 1730 statute deeming the foreign-born children of
English fathers natural born subjects and proclaimed that “all Persons
born, or who hereafter shall be born, out of the Ligeanace of the
Crown of England” to those fathers “are hereby declared and enacted
to be, natural born Subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, to all Intents,
Constructions and Purposes whatsoever, as if he and they had been
and were born in this Kingdom.”294 Like the 1708 Act, this statute did
not come with restrictions on government offices.
The 1772 Act was the last major “natural born subject” statute
Parliament enacted before the American revolutionary war.
Accordingly, it is worth pausing to survey the four centuries of past
statutes responsive to larger developments in England and the
European world order. Some commentators, like Michael Ramsey,
have concluded based on this diverse thicket of “natural born subject”
statutes that it had become a shape-shifting legal term of art meaning

291. An Act for Naturalizing Such Foreign Protestants as Have Served, or Shall
Serve for the Time Therein Mentioned, as Officers or Soldiers in His Majesty’s Royal
American Regiment, or as Engineers in America 1761, 2 Geo. 3 c. 25, § 1 (Eng.).
292. See The British Nationality Act, 1772, 13 Geo. 3 c. 21 (Eng.).
293. Id. § 1.
294. Id.
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whomever Parliament designated.295 The implication for “natural
born Citizen” is that Congress has similar discretion to define the term,
including its use in Article II as a citizenship requirement for presidential
eligibility.296 Accordingly, any person who is a citizen at birth under the
statutes then on the books is eligible for the presidency. Now-Judge Jill
Pryor, Akhil Amar, and a thorough Congressional Research Service
report by Jack Maskell, also take this position regarding the meaning
of the Natural Born Citizen Clause, albeit without as self-conscious a
commitment to originalism as Ramsey.297
I disagree with those esteemed commentators and believe that the
English statutes yield three basic principles that can inform our
understanding of the meaning of “natural born Citizen” in Article II.
The thicket of “natural born subject” statutes emphatically does not
stand for the proposition that “natural born” had become a term of art
that positive law can declare without basis in natural law. First, there
was an unbroken four-hundred-year-old rule dating back to De Natis
Ultra Mare that the children of English fathers or mothers sent abroad
in government service were natural born subjects without any disability
as to rights to inherit, hold property, sue in English Courts, hold high
office, or receive the Crown’s largesse.298 Indeed, it would have been
perverse to penalize loyal government servants who went abroad on
their sovereign’s orders by encumbering the rights of any children they
might have during their service abroad.
Second, there was also a rule grounded in De Natis Ultra Mare that
children born to English merchant fathers abroad were natural born
subjects, similarly without impediments.299 De Natis required mothers
295. See Ramsey, supra note 24, at (manuscript at 18–19) (determining that while
the statutory and common law definitions of “natural born subjects” were synonymous
in the beginning of the eighteenth century, Parliament changed the definition as it
saw fit through the eighteenth-century statutes).
296. See id. at 4 (explaining that Congress’s discretion comes from the power to
“establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4)).
297. See MASKELL, supra note 3, at 50 (including children born abroad to U.S.
parents who meet residency requirements as “natural born Citizens” and therefore
eligible for Executive Office); Pryor, supra note 25, at 899 (creating a “naturalized
born” approach which would extend presidential eligibility to any person with a right
to American citizenship at birth); Amar, supra note 24 (considering any foreign born
child who had at least one U.S. citizen parent who met residency requirements to be a
“natural born Citizen” and therefore eligible to be President).
298. See supra notes 224–45 and accompanying text (detailing the first English
naturalization statute, De Natis Ultra Mare, which allowed certain foreign-born children
the same rights as those born within England).
299. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
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to be English subjects as well, but its mandate was loosened by a 1708
statute as clarified by a 1730 statute. Of course, the rights could be
taken away from these jus sanguinis natural born subjects as they could
be from jus soli subjects if the fathers committed treason, were
banished, or served foreign enemies.
Third, there were mercantilist statutes minted for the first time in
the eighteenth century that deemed persons “natural born subjects”
based on religion, military, or nautical service, and an Englishman as
paternal grandfather.300 However, unlike natural born subjects in the
first two categories, the newer statutes required those made subjects
under their terms to take loyalty oaths and barred them from
government office and Crown largesse.
The first two rules ordained by De Natis Ultra Mare, one of the most
famous laws of the realm enacted by one of its greatest kings, Edward
III, had surely been absorbed into the common law of England by the
late eighteenth century, 400 years after its enactment. Their vintage,
pedigree, fame, and constant reaffirmations through statutes
cemented their status as jura natura, to use Coke’s expression for
natural law birthright rules in Calvin’s Case.301 It is likely that common
law courts of England in 1787 to 1789 would have enforced the two
rules of jus sanguinis as to the foreign-born children of public servants
or of Englishman merchant fathers, even without the existence of
pertinent statutes, just like jus soli in the 1608 Calvin’s Case, which cited
Ultra Mare with approval. The newer eighteenth-century statutes were
jurisprudential bushes by comparison to the towering live oak of Ultra
Mare, and any natural born subjects they created would likely not have
been recognized as such by the common law courts in the absence of
the statutes. Likewise, these rules of subjectship had not become part
of the common law by 1787 to 1789, when the National Born Citizen
Clause was adopted in the United States. The modern American
commentators who have concluded from the diversity of English
statutes that “natural born subject” had become a legal term of art
devoid of intrinsic meaning and wholly distinct from the common law
have not examined the evidence and traced the evolution of English
law with sufficient attention to the relevant history.

300. See supra notes 235–62 and accompanying text (discussing various statutes
passed in order to facilitate foreign commerce, granting “natural born subject” status
to various children born abroad to commoners).
301. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing Coke’s opinion that
allegiance is not just a part of England but a law of nature).
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Blackstone’s Commentaries and Early American Treatises

A careful reading of William Blackstone’s Commentaries, the treaties
of English law most valued by the American founders, confirms my
threefold interpretation regarding whether the “natural born subject”
rules in the statutes were part of the common law. First, Blackstone
acknowledged that “the children of the king’s ambassadors born
abroad were always held to be natural subjects: for as the father,
though in a foreign country, owes not even a local allegiance to the
prince to whom he is sent; so, with regard to the son also, he was held
(by a kind of postliminium) to be born under the king of England’s
allegiance, represented by his father, the ambassador.”302 The same
might be said of any subject who is posted outside of England in
government service. Second, with respect to commoners, he wrote:
To encourage also foreign commerce, it was enacted by statute [25
Edw. 3 stat. 1] that all children born abroad, provided both their
parents were at the time of the birth in allegiance to the king, and
the mother had passed the seas by her husband’s consent, might
inherit as if born in England; and accordingly it hath been so
adjudged in behalf of merchants. But by several more modern
statutes these restrictions are still farther taken off: so that all
children, born out of the king’s ligeance, whose fathers . . . were
natural-born subjects, are now natural-born subjects themselves, to all
intents and purposes, without any exception; unless their said
ancestors were attainted, or banished beyond sea, for high treason;
or were . . . in the service of a prince at enmity with Great Britain.303

Blackstone confirmed the shift from the two-parent rule of De Natis
Ultra Mare for commoners to father only and that the foreign-born
children of an English father were unconditionally natural born
subjects. He also explained the mercantilist aim of this extraterritorial
extension of jus sanguinis. Finally, he pointed out that a court had
already “so adjudged in behalf of merchants,” indicating that the rule
had become a part of the common law by judicial validation.304

302. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *373 (emphasis added). Postliminum was a
concept of Roman law origin that was much used in the law of nations at the time. It
meant a right that was regained upon reentry after being lost abroad. See COCKBURN,
supra note 15, at 7, 9–10; A. V. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE
TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 173–78 (London, Stevens and Sons & Sweet and Maxwell
1896) (discussing the rules of British nationality in the late 1800s).
303. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *373 (last emphasis added).
304. Id.
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What did Blackstone have to say about the non-jus sanguinis statutes that
deemed certain persons natural born subjects on the basis of religion or
service? He discussed them in a brief, two-paragraph section detached
from his discussions of Ultra Mare and the other statutes affording
natural born subject-ship to children born abroad to ambassadors and
English merchant fathers.305 He explained that naturalization could
only be “performed” by an act of Parliament that put an alien
in exactly the same state as if he had been born in the king’s
ligeance; except only that he is incapable . . . of being a member of
the privy council, or parliament, [etc.]. No bill for naturalization
can be received in either house of parliament, without such
disabling clause in it.306

As we have seen, the requirement of a disabling clause did not apply
to the foreign-born children of public servants and English merchant
fathers.307 After this, Blackstone described the short-lived 1708
“general naturalization act,” which was repealed in 1711, by which
Parliament deemed all foreign Protestants who took the Sacrament
and loyalty oaths natural born subjects.308 He then explained the other
experimental non-jus sanguinis statutes:
[E]very foreign seaman, who in time of war serves two years on board
an English ship is ipso facto naturalized . . . and all foreign
protestants, and Jews, upon their residing seven years in any of the
American colonies, without being absent above two months at a
time, . . . shall be . . . upon taking the oaths . . . naturalized to all
intents and purposes, as if they had been born in this kingdom . . .
and therefore are admissible to all such privileges . . . as protestants
or Jews born in this kingdom are entitled to.309

The takeaway is that Blackstone believed that the jus sanguinis statutes
originating with De Natis Ultra Mare, deeming the foreign-born
children of British public servants and merchant fathers natural born
subjects based on English ancestry, were fundamentally different from
the jus religionis and jus muneris statutes for foreigners. The former were
part of the common law tradition and natural law; the latter were not.
Chancellor James Kent of New York interpreted English common
law of natural born subjects in much the same way that Blackstone did
in his lectures delivered at Columbia University starting in 1794. Those
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id. at *374–75.
Id. at *374.
See supra Section II.A.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *375.
Id. at *375.
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lectures were subsequently published as his four-volume Commentaries
on American Law between 1826 and 1830.310 Kent explained:
An alien is a person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States.
There are some exceptions, however, to this rule, by the ancient
English law, as in the case of the children of public ministers abroad,
(provided their wives be English women) for they owe not even a
local allegiance to any foreign power. So, also, it is said, that in every
case, the children born abroad, of English parents, were capable, at
common law, of inheriting as natives, if the father went and
continued abroad in the character of an Englishman, and with the
approbation of the sovereign. The statute of [25 Edw. 3 stat. 1],
appears to have been made to remove doubts as to the certainty of
the common law on this subject, and it declared, that children
thereafter born without the ligeance of the king, whose father and
mother, at the time of their birth, were natives, should be entitled to
the privileges of native subjects, except the children of mothers who
should pass the sea without leave of their husbands. The statute of
7 Ann, c. 5. was to the same general effect; but the statute of [4 Geo.
2 c. 21.], required only that the father should be a natural born
subject at the birth of the child, and it applied to all children then
born, or thereafter to be born. Under these statutes it has been held,
that to entitle a child born abroad to the rights of an English natural
born subject, the father must be an English subject; and if the father
be an alien, the child cannot inherit to the mother, though she was
born under the king’s allegiance.311

Thus, Kent, perhaps the most famous of the earliest commentators
on the U.S. Constitution, clearly acknowledged the role of jus sanguinis
with respect to extraterritorial natural born subjects under English
common law. He diverged from my interpretation in requiring an
English mother in the case of public servants and failing to acknowledge
the statutes of Charles II and William III that suggest the children of
English mothers attending the Crown were also natural born subjects.312
It is also noteworthy how much he emphasizes the sexist, patrilineal
orientation of the rules, specifically emphasizing that “the father must
be an English subject; and if the father be an alien, the child cannot
inherit to the mother,” even if she were an English subject.313

310. See generally 1–4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (New York, O.
Halsted 1826–1830).
311. 2 id. at 43–44 (citations omitted).
312. See supra notes 233–37 and accompanying text.
313. 2 KENT, supra note 310, at 44.
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Unfortunately, other early American treatise writers were not as
astute as Chancellor Kent in their assessment of English common law
and Blackstone’s treatise. Several early American jurists misread
Blackstone to say that English common law recognized only jus soli as
a natural birthright principle, and that Parliament had to pass statutes
for jus sanguinis to apply extraterritorially to the children of English
government servants and merchants.314 We have seen that this was not
an accurate reading of Blackstone, but it was an understandable one
given the black-and-white manner in which Blackstone drew a line
between aliens and natural born subjects elsewhere in the
Commentaries: “The first and most obvious division of the people is into
aliens and natural-born subjects. Natural-born subjects are such as are
born within the dominions of the crown of England . . . and aliens,
such as are born out if it.”315
St. George Tucker316 who published the first U.S. constitutional law
treatise in 1803 as an American law update of Blackstone’s
Commentaries, paraphrased him in the following way:
Prior to the adoption of the constitution, the people inhabiting the
different states might be divided into two classes: natural born
citizens, or those born within the state, and aliens, or such as were
born out of it. The first, by their birth-right, became entitled to all
the privileges of citizens; the second, were entitled to none, but such
as were held out and given by the laws of the respective states prior
to their emigration.317

Both Blackstone’s sweeping statement and Tucker’s adaptation of it
to the American context did not contemplate the case of the children
of citizens/subjects who were born in a foreign land while the parents
were there temporarily, for instance, because the government had sent
314. See, e.g., 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF
REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 257 (1803) [hereinafter
TUCKER] (concluding that only an act of Parliament could grant subject status to a
foreign-born person).
315. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *366.
316. Tucker had moved from the British colony of Bermuda to Virginia 1772 at
nineteen, fought in the Revolutionary War, and started a law practice and teaching
career after independence. See Mary Ann Kernan, St. George Tucker: A Biographical
Sketch, 46 L. LIBR. J. 98–103 (1953). He did not attend the Constitutional Convention
or the Virginia ratifying convention, but he was a respected lawyer, judge, and teacher
in Virginia, and was appointed a federal district judge by his fellow Virginian James
Madison in 1813. Id. at 102–03.
317. TUCKER, supra note 314, at 256 (quoting Letter from George Nicholas to His
Friend in Virginia (1799), at 7).
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them there. Kent, of course, did. Indeed, Blackstone, too, explicitly
acknowledged such cases: “An Englishman who removes to France, or
to China, owes the same allegiance to the king of England there as at
home, and twenty years hence as well as now.”318 If that Englishman
should happen to have a child while abroad, why should the infant be
deemed a natural-born subject of the French king or the Chinese
emperor, and not of the king of England?
It is unsurprising that Tucker and other early Americans, with the
exception of Kent, were prone to make general statements overlooking
Blackstone’s explicit references to the status of children born to
English officials and merchants abroad. The sea that separated the
British islands from the European continent was only eighteen nautical
miles at their closest point; the United States was separated by a moat
of thousands of miles. The frequent conflation of “native born” and
“natural born” citizen in early American treatises illustrates the extent
to which early Americans were centrally concerned with what was
happening within the United States, not extraterritorially. As we saw
from the Constitutional Convention debates, the words “native” or
“native born” had a place-bound connotation, and were used to refer
to persons born in the United States, typically to distinguish
immigrants or foreign late arrivals.319 Plainly, “native” was a factual,
descriptive adjective, without any jurisprudential implication of
“natural” law generally or “natural” law birthright principles
specifically.320 But Tucker’s Commentaries mistakes “natural born” for
“native born” in in his discussion of the Article II, Section 1 citizenship
requirement for President. Tucker wrote:

318. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *369–70.
319. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 105–07 (discussing the remarks of John
Mercer of Maryland and Roger Sherman of Connecticut on August 13, 1787); see also
MASKELL, supra note 3, at 31 (“In common usage with respect to U.S. citizenship, it
may also more narrowly mean anyone born physically within the geographic
boundaries of the United States . . . .”).
320. The preeminent modern U.S. immigration law treatise defines “native-born
citizens” thusly:
This is by far the largest group of U.S. citizens, and their status is acquired
simply through birth in the United States . . . . The Constitution does not refer
to native-born citizens, although it does mention natural-born citizens. Nor
does this term appear in the statute, which includes the native born among
various categories who acquire citizenship at birth. However, the designation
of the native born is an accurate and convenient one, generally used in
colloquial and legal discussions.
7 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 91.02(4)(a) (rev. ed. 2017).
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That provision in the constitution which requires that the president
shall be a native-born citizen (unless he were a citizen of the United
States when the constitution was adopted,) is a happy means of
security against foreign influence, which, whereever it is capable of
being exerted, is to be dreaded more than the plague.321

To summarize, jus soli was the major principle of natural birthright
citizenship within the United States, but it did not follow that jus
sanguinis could not operate extraterritorially as to children born to
certain Americans parents. That was the rule in England promulgated
by De Natis Ultra Mare in 1350 and part of the common law tradition
four hundred years later as confirmed by Blackstone and the early
American jurist James Kent.322 But, post-founding American treatises,
starting with St. George Tucker’s American law update of Blackstone’s
Commentaries published in 1803, tended to emphasize the first
proposition only, making it seem as if jus soli was the only principle
inside or outside the United States.323 The emphasis is understandable:
the early writers’ focus was on persons inside the United States after the
adoption of the Constitution between 1787 and 1789. The birth outside
of the United States of children to parents who were U.S. citizens was
a negligible concern at the time: the United States had only a few
merchants and a handful of ambassadors abroad, and no soldiers on
foreign expedition or governments in exile.324 Put another way, jus soli
was discussed in absolute terms because the geographical separation
of the United States from Europe and the geopolitical realities of the
new republic’s military and economic weakness rendered operation of
jus sanguinis vis-à-vis American citizens abroad a small concern as
compared to the magnitude of the issue for the British Empire.
Accordingly, with the exception of Kent’s Commentaries, early nineteenth
century American treatises generally followed Tucker’s lead and did not
address the question of whether a child born extraterritorially to U.S.
parents is a natural born citizen. As we shall see, the one time that
early Americans were clearly focused on the question of extraterritorial

321. TUCKER, supra note 314, at 323 (emphasis added).
322. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *373 (confirming foreign-born children of
ambassadors were considered “natural subjects”); 2 KENT, supra note 310, at 57 (stating
no person may be eligible for the Presidency if not a “natural born Citizen”).
323. See supra notes 314–18.
324. See Office of the Historian, Principal Officers and Chiefs of Mission by Year: 1788,
US DEP’T OF ST., https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/by-year/1788
(last visited Nov. 30, 2017) (listing three ambassadors sent abroad by the United States
in the year the Constitution was ratified).
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births to American citizens was when the First Congress enacted the
inaugural Naturalization Act of 1790.325 And on that occasion,
founding-era Americans adopted a jus sanguinis rule modeled on the
great De Natis Ultra Mare. But, before we turn to the American statutes,
it is worth considering the influence of non-English sources on early
American conceptions of natural born citizenship.
III.

NATURAL LAW AND THE LAW OF NATIONS

Most Article II “natural born Citizen” scholars dismiss the possibility
that the Clause relied importantly on non-English sources.326 Just as
commentators tend to over-emphasize the exclusivity of English
common law as a source of the meaning of “natural born Citizen,” they
under-emphasize the importance of natural law and the law of nations.
This is strange, given that the constitutional word “natural” is most
plausibly an invocation of natural law birthright principles, and the
reality that Lord Coke recognized in Calvin’s Case: English lawyers of
the time believed the common law was a reflection of natural law.
The most important law of nations reference for founding-era
Americans was the Law of Nations, or Principles of the Law of Nature,
Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, a 1758 treatise
by Emer de Vattel of Neufchatel.327 As I noted in the Introduction, the
U.S. Senate bought Vattel’s book and Blackstone’s book, and those
books alone, for its official use in 1794 to deal with foreign relations
issues.328 Experts in U.S. foreign relations law have long been aware of
Vattel’s importance to U.S. constitutional history.329 However, it has
only been in the twenty-first century that scholars have mined his
broader influence on U.S. law, including constitutional provisions

325. See ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790), repealed by ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414 (1795).
326. See, e.g., MASKELL, supra note 3, at 22. (“It would appear to be somewhat fanciful
to contend that in employing terms in the U.S. Constitution the framers would
disregard the specific and express meaning of those precise terms in British common
law, the law in the American colonies, and subsequently in all of the states in the
United States after independence, in favor of secretly using, without comment or
explanation, a contrary, non-existent English translation of a phrase in a Frenchlanguage treatise on international law.”).
327. See generally VATTEL, supra note 21.
328. See supra note 20.
329. See Introduction to VATTEL, supra note 21, at ix (discussing the importance of
Vattel’s works in shaping early American political discourse).
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without direct connection to foreign affairs, such as the Eleventh
Amendment, which addressed state sovereign immunity.330
Unlike the English statutes and treatises, the Swiss republican Vattel
wrote of citizens, not subjects. He began:
The citizens are the members of the civil society: bound to this
society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally
participate in its advantages. The natives, or natural-born citizens
[the French word is indigene], are those born in the country, of
parents who are citizens . . . . I say, that, in order to be of the country,
it is necessary that a person be born of a father who is a citizen; for,
if he is born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his birth,
and not his country.331

In Vattel’s view, jus sanguinis trumped jus soli in determining “natural
born” citizenship: a child born in the territory of one sovereign was
not a citizen of the sovereign if the child’s father was not a citizen.332
The idea was that a child, as a minor, inherited the allegiance of the
father through a “tacit consent” which the child could renounce upon
coming of age.333 Note the resemblance of Vattel’s logic here to
Madison’s reasoning in his May 1789 speech. “[E]very man is born
free; and the son of a citizen, when come to the years of discretion,
may examine whether it be convenient for him to join the society for
which he was destined by his birth.”334 Vattel’s conclusion that a child
could consent to give up natural born citizenship as an adult diverged
from Blackstone’s characterization of natural born subjectship in
England as indefeasible.335 Tellingly, both Kent and Tucker agreed
with Vattel and disagreed with Blackstone, in terms of what they viewed
as the more universal principle.336 The reason for this flowed from the
330. See, e.g., Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International
Law and State Sovereignty, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1027, 1061 (2002) (explaining that Vattel’s
treatise “was one of the most influential legal treatises in American constitutional
law”).
331. See VATTEL, supra note 21, at 217–18.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 218.
334. Id. at 220.
335. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *360 (“Natural allegiance is therefore a
debt of gratitude; which cannot be forfeited, cancelled, or altered, by any change of
time, place, or circumstance, nor by anything but the united concurrence of the
legislature.”).
336. See 2 KENT, supra note 310, at 36–37 (agreeing with the general presumption
that citizens have the right to emigrate from their native country); TUCKER, supra note
314, at 97 (stating that if a citizen renounces himself from his native country, he is no
longer responsible to that government’s laws).
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difference between citizenship and subjectship. Citizenship was
grounded in consent which can logically be withdrawn; subjectship was
bestowed and therefore created a permanent obligation of allegiance
to the king.
Vattel also had a different view of naturalization than Blackstone.
He wrote:
A nation . . . may grant to a foreigner the quality of citizen, by
admitting him into the body of the political society. This is called
naturalization . . . . [T]here are states, as, for instance, England,
where the single circumstance of being born in the country,
naturalizes the children of a foreigner.337

Blackstone did not characterize the operation of jus soli in England as
to an alien as “naturalization.” Rather, he saw subjectship as a natural
state of being for any person born in England, even of foreign parents,
owing to the Crown’s protection that enveloped all at birth. Vattel
then proceeded to talk about the citizenship of children born to
parents abroad.
It is asked whether the children born of citizens in a foreign
country are citizens? . . . By the law of nature alone, children follow
the condition of their fathers, and enter into all their rights; the
place of birth produces no change in this particular, and cannot, of
itself, furnish any reason for taking from a child what nature has
given him.338

With specific regard to diplomats or soldiers abroad, Vattel reasoned
that because they had
not quitted their native country to settle elsewhere[,]
. . . children born out of the country, in the armies of state, or in the
house of its minister at a foreign court, are reputed born in the
country; for, a citizen who is absent with his family, on the service of
the state, but still dependent on it, and subject to its jurisdiction,
cannot be considered as having quitted its territory.339

In this regard, Vattel is in perfect agreement with Blackstone. He
believed that a child born outside of the father’s country, to an
ambassador, soldier, “on the service of the state,” or even a private
father is “by the law of nature” born a citizen of the father’s state.340
To summarize, it was only intra-territorially that English common
law and the law of continental European countries like France differed
337.
338.
339.
340.

VATTEL, supra note 21, at 218.
Id. at 219.
Id.
Id. at 218–19.
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as to who counted as natural born subjects or citizens. The law within
England was jus soli; the law within the continental nations was jus
sanguinis. But, all European nations agreed that, with regards to the
children of subjects born extraterritorially, jus sanguinis applied. In
England, this was not the ancient common law of the Saxons, but it was
surely common law by the late eighteenth century, 400 years after the
first promulgation of the rule in De Natis Ultra Mare—“On Children
Born Beyond the Sea.”341 The English hybrid model of jus soli and jus
sanguinis was precisely what the United States adopted—jus soli within
the United States and jus sanguinis outside of the United States for the
children of citizen public servants and fathers.342 Both Vattel and
Blackstone confirm the reality that late eighteenth century Europe and
America were sexist by modern standards: jus sanguinis operated
through patrilineal descent only.343 The early United States did not
adopt the rule of jus sanguinis over jus soli domestically, or at least that
was the holding in the 1898 decision in Wong Kim Ark. Where early
Americans did opt for Vattel over Blackstone, however, was in the
former’s conviction that allegiance was not permanent.344 And this was
the natural consequence of the belief that citizenship, unlike
subjectship, was based on consent.
IV.

“NATURAL BORN CITIZEN” STATUTES IN THE UNITED STATES

The five years between the end of the Revolutionary War in 1783 and
the adoption of the Constitution between 1787 and 1789 were marked
with great change, turmoil, and experimentation. Among other
things, state legislatures enacted statutes using the words “natural born
citizen” or “natural born subject.” The purpose of these statutes was
to declare that persons born outside of the relevant state were to have
rights to inherit, hold property, and sue in the state’s courts; they did
not address the specific issue of the rights or status of the children of
state citizens born outside the state.345 Commentators like Ramsey
341. See supra notes 287–97 (detailing two examples of 18th century statutes
incorporating “natural born subject” status to foreign-born children of English fathers).
342. See Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790), repealed by ch. 20, 1 Stat.
414 (1795).
343. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *373 (noting that if a child’s father was a
natural-born subject, so was the child); VATTEL, supra note 21, at 219 (“[C]hildren
follow the condition of their fathers.”).
344. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
345. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 24 (manuscript at 28–29) (collecting state statutes
using the phrases “natural born citizen” or “natural born subject”); infra Section IV.A.
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have emphasized these statutes’ seeming continuity with English
common law, even to the point of using “natural born subject” long
after the revolutionary war had been won.346 But, as I have pointed out
earlier, these statutes did not envision or deal with the issue of the
children of citizens who were born outside of the United States.347
Moreover, any out-of-state citizens born in other U.S. states, as opposed
to foreign states, would have been entitled to the same privileges and
immunities as in-state citizens under both the Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution.348 Nor, for that matter, is
continuity with English common law inconsistent with my argument,
since, as demonstrated above, the common law had incorporated jus
sanguinis extraterritorially with respect to public servants and the
children of Englishmen by the late eighteenth century.349 Accordingly,
these statutes are largely irrelevant for present purposes.
A.

1784 Maryland Statute Making Lafayette and His Male Heirs
“Natural Born Citizens”

There was another kind of state statute in the postwar, preconstitutional period that has not been examined by prior Natural
Born Citizen Clause scholars. Several state legislatures enacted laws
granting citizenship status to foreign soldiers who had fought with
distinction in the Revolutionary War, most notably the Marquis de
Lafayette and Baron Friedrich von Steuben.350 Because these state
statutes made the foreign soldiers citizens before “the time of the
adoption of this Constitution,” they were constitutionally eligible to be
President, since state law necessarily determined who was a “citizen of
the United States” at the time.351

346. See Ramsey, supra note 24, (manuscript at 27–31) (discussing the tendency of
states to follow the English use of “natural born subjects” in defining citizenship).
347. See supra Section II.B (explaining the lack of early American treatises dealing
with the issue of citizenship for subjects born outside the United States).
348. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).
349. See supra Section II.A (detailing the development of jus sanguinis throughout
the eighteenth century English empire).
350. See, e.g., 1784 Conn. Pub. Acts 439 (considering Marquis de Lafayette to be a
“Citizen[] of this State”); 1785 Va. Acts 8 (declaring Lafayette to be a “citizen of this State”).
351. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; see KETTNER, supra note 12, at 213–14 (noting that
states “assumed sovereign control over naturalization,” and they granted citizenship to
many British persons who served for America in the Revolutionary War).
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A law titled “An Act for the Naturalization of the Marquis de la
Fayette” passed by the Virginia General Assembly in 1785 is an
illustrative example:
Whereas the Marquis de La Fayette is eminently distinguished,
by early and signal exertions in defence of American liberty; And
whereas this illustrious Nobleman continues to afford testimonies of
unceasing affection to this State, and the General Assembly being
solicitous to bestow the most decisive mark of regard which a
Republic can give;
Be it enacted, That the Marquis de la Fayette be henceforth
deemed and considered a citizen of this State, and that he shall enjoy
all the rights, privileges, and immunities, thereunto belonging.352

The Connecticut legislature, in October 1784, went one step further
and gave citizenship to La Fayette and his son:
Whereas the Right Honble the Marquis De La Fayette Mareschal
De Camp of the Armies of the Armies of the King of France and
Major General in the late Army of the United States of America in
their late War with the King of Great Britain has exhibited his
disinterested Attachment to the Liberties of Mankind in a very
illustrious and disinterested manner—
Therefore Resolved by this Assembly that the Marquis De La Fayette,
and his Son George Washington Esqr be and they are hereby
declared free Citizens of this State to all Intents constructions and
purposes whatsoever.353

Most interesting of all, the Maryland General Assembly, also in 1784,
passed an act making Lafayette “and his male heirs for ever . . . natural
born citizens,” the very words used in the Constitution.354 By operation
of this statute, Lafayette was presumptively eligible to be President
under both citizenship prongs of Article II—as a citizen of the United
States at the time of the Constitution’s adoption and as a “natural born
Citizen.” Furthermore, because the Maryland statute appears never to
have been rescinded, it would appear that any male heir of Lafayette,
even today, could plausibly claim presidential eligibility as a “natural
born Citizen” under the statute. Despite its clear importance to the
meaning of “natural born Citizen” in the U.S. Constitution, no prior
scholarship on the Natural Born Citizen Clause has discussed it. The

352. 1785 Va. Acts 8.
353. 1784 Conn. Pub. Acts 439.
354. See An Act to Naturalize the Major-General the Marquis de la Fayette and His
Heirs Male For Ever, 1784 Md. Laws 378.
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statute, entitled “An ACT to naturalize major-general the marquis de
la Fayette and his male heirs forever,” provided:
Whereas the general assembly of Maryland, anxious to
perpetuate a name dear to the state, and to recognize the marquis
de la Fayette for one of its citizens, who, at the age of nineteen, left
his native country, and risked his life in the late revolution; who, on
his joining the American army, after being appointed by congress to
the rank of major-general, disinterestedly refused the usual rewards
of command, and fought only to deserve what he attained, the
character of patriot and soldier; who, when appointed to conduct an
incursion into Canada, called forth by his prudence and
extraordinary discretion the approbation of congress; who, at the
head of an army in Virginia, baffled the manœuvres of a
distinguished general, and excited the admiration of the oldest
commanders; who early attracted the notice and obtained the
friendship of the illustrious general Washington; and who laboured
and succeeded in raising the honour and the name of the United
States of America: Therefore,
Be it enacted, by the general assembly of Maryland, That the marquis
de la Fayette, and his heirs male for ever, shall be, and they and each
of them are hereby deemed, adjudged, and taken to be, natural born
citizens of this state, and shall henceforth be entitled to all the
immunities, rights and privileges, of natural born citizens thereof,
they and every of them conforming to the constitution and laws of
this state, in the enjoyment and exercise of such immunities, rights
and privileges.355

The Maryland legislature’s 1784 grant of “natural born citizenship”
to Lafayette and his male heirs forever because of his heroic military
service and labor in “raising the honour and the name of the United
States of America” generates three key insights.356 First, it suggests that
Americans of the time accepted that a legislature might grant natural
born citizenship to someone not born in the United States or born
abroad to U.S. parents for proven loyalty to the political community of
the United States. It was in this sense similar to the British jus muneris
for soldiers and seamen.357 But, unlike those British natural born
subject statutes, natural born citizenship under the 1784 American

355. Id.
356. Id.
357. See An Act for the Encouragement of Trade to America 1707, 6 Ann. c. 64, § 20
(Eng.) (granting citizenship to soldiers and seamen who served for at least two years
during Queen Anne’s War).
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statute was without limitation on office-holding or contingent on oaths
of loyalty or on any other condition.
Second, the statute reinforces the patrilineal understanding of “natural
born Citizen” in the 1780s and the prominence of jus sanguinis as a natural
birthright principle. Not only was Lafayette himself made a natural born
citizen because of his loyal service, but the statute also presumes that
his descendants, who have his blood, will also be loyal.358 But only his
male descendants are declared to be natural born citizens “for ever.”359
Third and most importantly, the statute suggests that a U.S.
legislature might deem a person a “natural born Citizen” based on a
connection to the United States other than birthplace. At first glance,
this appears to validate the congressional naturalization power theory
of Ramsey, Maskell, Pryor, and Amar, regarding the meaning of
“natural born Citizen.”360 On their view, if Congress were to pass the
same statute today with respect to Lafayette’s descendants declaring
them “natural born Citizens,” then any descendant of Lafayette born
after the statute was enacted could be President of the United States.361
Ramsey, for instance, concludes that Congress’s power to enact a
statute conveying natural born status could not be applied to persons
“with no connections to the United States at birth.”362 But, Lafayette’s
heirs surely have a very strong connection to the United States by virtue
of being the lineal descents of a founding father, akin to present-day
lineal descendants of Alexander Hamilton or Benjamin Franklin. And
the 1784 Maryland statute’s extension of natural born citizen status to
Lafayette’s “heirs male for ever” supplies direct founding-era evidence
that they have the requisite connections to the United States at birth
that Ramsey would require.
In my opinion, the reason why the 1784 Maryland statute ultimately
does not support a general naturalization power under Article I to
confer natural born citizenship sufficient for presidential eligibility on
any deserving foreigner or similarly situated group of foreigners is
found in the other citizenship option for presidential eligibility. Recall

358. See 1784 Md. Laws 378.
359. Id.
360. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
361. Congress does still grant honorary citizenship (e.g., to Winston Churchill), but
it does not come with the rights of natural born citizenship or even regular U.S.
citizenship. See H.R. Rep. No. 113-548, at 2 (2014) (granting honorary citizenship to
Bernardo de Gálvez y Madrid and noting that Churchill had previously been granted
honorary citizenship).
362. Ramsey, supra note 24, (manuscript at 42).
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that Article II provides that any person who was a citizen of the several
United States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution is also
eligible to be President.363 Thus, Lafayette would have been eligible to
be President by operation of the pre-constitutional Virginia and
Connecticut statutes conferring citizenship on him, without the need
for the “natural born citizens” provision of the Maryland statute. As
discussed in Section I.B above, the purpose of Article II’s provision of
presidential eligibility for citizens at the time of the Constitution’s
adoption was to recognize the special contribution of foreign soldiers
like Lafayette who had fought to establish the new Republic. This was
the same purpose animating the 1784 Maryland statute. This sort of
special recognition, however, was a unique, one-time exception, not a
justification that might be replicated by Congress or any state
legislatures in the future. This may explain why neither the United
States nor the states enacted any more statutes like the 1784 Maryland
statute granting non-honorific, natural born citizenship to foreigners
after the Constitution was adopted. Let us turn now to the first
naturalization statute enacted by the new Congress six years later in
1790, which also used the words “natural born citizens.”
B.

1790 Naturalization Statute and Subsequent U.S. Naturalization Statutes

The First Congress’s inaugural uniform naturalization statute
became law on March 26, 1790.364 The 1790 statute is the only U.S.
national law other than Article II to use the words “natural born
citizens.”365 The use of those extinct words, coupled with the fact that
the 1790 statute was enacted only two years after the Constitution’s
adoption by a Congress that included several members who had played
leading roles the Constitution’s drafting and ratification, explains its
rightful prominence in all existing accounts of the meaning of the
Natural Born Citizen Clause.
The particular context in which the words “natural born citizens”
are used in the 1790 statute, however, had nothing to do with
presidential eligibility. The phrase was used in a secondary part of the
statute to designate certain persons born outside of the United States
who did not have to apply and meet the residence, oath, and good
character requirements for any other person born outside the United

363. See U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 5.
364. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414 (1795).
365. Id. at 104.
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States to become a U.S. citizen.366 The statute’s primary purpose was
to specify these “naturalization” requirements.
Thus, the statute’s first and main provision stated that “any alien
being a free white person” who had resided two years within the United
States “may be admitted to become a citizen” by applying to “any
common law court of record” in a state “wherein he shall have resided”
for a year, “making proof” of good character, and taking an oath or
affirmation to support the U.S. Constitution.367 The statute continued,
“the children of such persons so naturalized, dwelling within the
United States” and “under the age of twenty-one years at the time of
such naturalization, shall also be considered as citizens of the United
States.”368 The last sentence of the statute, in which the words “natural
born citizens” appeared, provided in full:
And the children of citizens of the United States, that may be born
beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be
considered as natural born citizens: Provided, That the right of
citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never
been resident in the United States: Provided also, That no person
heretofore proscribed by any state, shall be admitted a citizen
aforesaid, except by an act of the legislature of the state in which
such person was proscribed.369

A few observations are in order about the statute. First, it bears a
remarkable resemblance to the 1350 statute De Natis Ultra Mare which
literally means “on children born beyond sea.” As noted above, this
landmark statute did not use the exact words “natural born subjects,”
but it was the undisputed ancestor of Parliament’s later “natural born
subject” statutes, such as the Act of 1708, as Blackstone acknowledged
in the Commentaries.370 However, Blackstone did not quote the precise
words “children born beyond sea,” instead writing “all children born
abroad.”371 This suggests that the First Congress knew the original
source or knew about it from a source other than Blackstone. The
bottom line is that the four centuries-old De Natis Ultra Mare was a
monumental statute, likely known not just to the lawyers among the
founding Americans like John Adams or Alexander Hamilton, but to

366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

Id.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 104.
Id.
See supra notes 341–44 and accompanying text.
See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *373.
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many in the United States who had themselves been “children born
beyond sea” in their former lives as British subjects.
Second, like the 1708 English statute, the American statute appears
ambiguous about whether both parents had to be U.S. citizens or only
one parent, possibly a mother, had to be a U.S. citizen. Recall,
however, that Parliament enacted a statute in 1730 to “explain” that
the ambiguous 1708 statute referred to the children of English fathers
only.372 And De Natis Ultra Mare had required both parents to be
English. Two esteemed modern commentators, Paul Clement and
Neal Katyal, however, resolve the ambiguity in the 1790 U.S. statute to
mean that only one parent, either mother or father, had to be a U.S.
citizen: “The Naturalization Act of 1790 expanded the class of citizens
at birth to include children born abroad of citizen mothers as long as the
father had at least been resident in the United States at some point.”373 A
crucial step in their analysis is the statute’s command that the father
must have been “resident in the United States.”374 They conclude from
this condition that the statute applied to a foreign-born child of a U.S.
citizen mother and non-citizen father so long as the foreign father was
“resident in the United States” before the child’s birth.375
This is an utterly implausible reading of the 1790 statute. The only
way to read the father’s residence requirement in light of the practical
realities of the late eighteenth century is to read it as implicitly
presuming that the father of the child was a U.S. citizen with prior
residence in the United States. The notion that the First Congress
contemplated an American woman meeting a foreign man in the
United States and followed him back to his country to have a child
372. See The British Nationality Act 1730, 4 Geo. 2 c. 21, § 1 (Eng.). The 1790 U.S.
statute also carved out of “natural born” citizen status the children of fathers who had
not been proscribed by any States, which is similar to the 1730 statute’s exception from
natural born subject status foreign-born children whose fathers were “attainted of high
Treason” or “or was in the actual Service of any foreign Prince or State then in enmity
with the Crown.” Id. § 3. An exception to the exception was made for, among others,
“any Child” of a treasonous Father who “professed the Protestant Religion” and had
resided in Great Britain or Ireland “for the Space of two Years” between the
enactments of the 1708 and 1731 statutes, or had possessed, received, sold, or settled
“any Lands, Tenements or Hereditaments” within Great Britain or Ireland during the
same period. Id. The U.S. 1790 statute likely substituted the word “proscribed” for
“attainted of High treason” because of the U.S. Constitution’s dual prohibitions on
bills of attainder. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder . . . shall be
passed.”); id. § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder.”).
373. Clement & Katyal, supra note 23.
374. Id.
375. Id.
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there, however ordinary it may seem today, is anachronistic. Even now,
no national immigration statute, in the United States or otherwise,
provides that a person may be a citizen if a mother is a citizen and the
foreign father lived at some point in the mother’s country. All modern
statutes require only the parent (whether mother or father) from
whom the child’s citizenship is derived to have resided in the country;
the foreign parent’s residence in the country is irrelevant.
Why then, one might wonder, did the First Congress require that a
U.S. citizen father have resided in the United States for him to pass
U.S. citizenship on to his child born abroad? The answer is simple
enough. If there were no residency requirement, then it would be
possible for a future child, generations later, to have “natural born”
U.S. citizenship, despite being long removed from any ancestors who
lived there and possessed residual loyalty to the United States. A child
born outside of the United States, who derived her U.S. citizenship
from her father who was born and lived his entire life abroad and who
derived his U.S. citizenship from his father (her grandfather) who was
the last ancestor to have lived in the United States would still be a
“natural born citizen.” The chain could regress infinitely.376 The
parental residency requirement is intended to prevent this potentially
infinite regress.
Indeed, the specific residency duration requirement for a U.S.
citizen father who originates derivative citizenship for his foreign-born
child is the one aspect of who counts as a “natural born Citizen”
376. James Wilson, who, as we have seen, played a leading role in the congressional
citizenship requirement debates at the Constitutional Convention, may have suggested
in a pamphlet that he wrote in 1768 that this infinite regress was consistent with natural
law. See generally James Wilson, Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative
Authority of the British Parliament, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 3–31 (Kermit
L. Hall & David Mark Hall, eds., 2007). He quoted Lord Bacon’s opinion in Calvin’s
Case for the following proposition:
Hence all children born in any part of the world, if they be of English parents
continuing at that time as liege subjects to the king, and having done no act
to forfeit the benefit of their allegiance, are ipso facto naturalized: and if they
have issue, and their descendants intermarry among themselves, such
descendants are naturalized to all generations.
Id. at 29. Wilson is clearly thinking of the condition of the American colonists, who
would have had a claim to British natural born subjectship by virtue of jus soli if they
were born within the British Empire. To the extent he refers explicitly to jus sanguinis,
however, it seems he is suggesting that children born outside of England (but in the
colonies) whose parents are both loyal British subjects, or the children of loyal subject
couples, would be natural born subjects, too, potentially ad infinitum. I am grateful to
John Mikhail for pointing me to this discussion.
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eligible to be President under Article II that the Constitution leaves to
Congress’s discretion. The natural law principle of jus sanguinis in the
late eighteenth century only dictated that a child born
extraterritorially inherits the father’s nationality.377 It did not
necessarily compel prior residence in the country in question, much
less a specific term of years to establish the citizen father’s prior
residence—that was the office of positive law via enactment.378 In a
recent case, Sessions v. Morales-Santana,379 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that Congress may not, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause,
enact different period-of-residence requirements for unwed fathers
and mothers to pass U.S. citizenship to their children.380 The Court in
Morales-Santana did not purport to address the constitutional meaning
of “natural born Citizen” as a condition for presidential eligibility in
Article II.381 However, the Court’s decision would presumably apply to
hold Congress to enacting the same residency requirement for U.S.
citizenship of fathers and mothers of children born abroad who are
entitled to U.S. citizenship by birth.
One last point worth mentioning about the 1790 U.S. statute, as
compared to the prior English statutes, is that it underscores the
difference between natural born “subjectship” and “citizenship.”
Recall that the experimental eighteenth-century, British “natural born
subject” statutes for foreigners who were Protestants or served in the
military, merchant ships, or whaleboats, came with conditions on
holding government offices.382
The limitation illustrated the
subordinate nature of “subjectship” to the Crown bestowed by
Parliament, which could impose prohibitions on what those whom it
deemed natural born subjects could do. Natural born “citizenship” in
the United States, by contrast, could not be granted subject to
conditions on office-holding that Congress deemed proper.
Subsequent Congresses replaced the phrase “natural born Citizens”
in the 1790 statute with “citizens of the United States” in the next four
naturalization statutes of 1795,383 1798 (one of the infamous Alien and

377. See MASKELL, supra note 3, at 2 (describing the long-standing tradition of
incorporating jus sanguinis into British law).
378. Id. at 2–3.
379. 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
380. Id. at 1693–94.
381. See id. at 1687 (discussing citizenship requirements generally).
382. See supra notes 273–94.
383. An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, and to Repeal the Act
Heretofore Passed on That Subject, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414 (1795).
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Sedition Acts),384 1802,385 and 1855.386 The 1795 statute is particularly
important because it was the enactment that repealed the 1790 statute
and substituted “citizens of United States” for “natural born citizens.”387
The 1795 statute was more demanding as to the requirements for
naturalization, consistent with greater concern for foreign monarchical
influence during a time of revolutionary turmoil in Europe.388 For
example, although the new statute provided that any foreigner who
was a “free white person” then residing in the United States was
grandfathered into the two-year residence requirement of the 1790
statute, in the future, any aliens would have to reside for five years.389
They would also have to make an oath or affirmation of “bona fide”
intent to become citizens of the United States at least three years before
becoming citizens.390 And, in addition to taking the oath or affirmation
to support the Constitution prescribed by the 1790 law, any foreigner
seeking to be admitted had to “absolutely and entirely renounce and
abjure all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign prince, potentate,
state, or sovereignty whatever, and particularly by name, the prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty, whereof he was before a citizen or subject.”391
Another important change from the 1790 Act was the structure of
the statute. Instead of the final sentence of the 1790 statute, in which
“natural born citizens” was used to signify who did not require
naturalization, the 1795 statute combined the two “children of”

384. An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798); An Act in
Addition to the Act, Entitled “An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against
the United States,” ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798); An Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, 1 Stat.
570 (1790).
385. An Act to Establish an Uniform rule of Naturalization, and to Repeal the Acts
Heretofore Passed on That Subject, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153 (1802), amended by 10 Stat. 604 (1855).
386. An Act to Secure the Right of Citizenship to Children of Citizens of the United
States Born Out of the Limits Thereof, ch. 71, 10 Stat. 604 (1855).
387. See ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414 (“And be it further enacted, That the act intitled ‘An Act
to establish an uniform rule of naturalization,’ passed the twenty-sixth day of March,
one thousand seven hundred and ninety, be, and the same is hereby repealed.”).
388. See Gerald L. Neuman, Justifying U.S. Naturalization Policies, 35 VA. J. INT’L L.
237, 253 (1994) (noting that the 1795 statute required renunciation of titles of nobility
and judicial finding of fidelity to the Constitution).
389. See ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414.
390. Id.
391. Id. Any such alien who “shall have borne any hereditary title, or been of any
of the orders of nobility, in the kingdom or state from which he came” also had to
“make an express renunciation of his title or order of nobility.” Id.
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provisions of the prior statute.392 Thus, section 3 of the 1795 statute
provided that the following shall be “considered as citizens of the
United States”: (1) children of “persons duly naturalized” living within
the United States who were less than twenty-one years of age at the time
of the parent’s naturalization and (2) “the children of citizens of the
United States, born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United
States.”393 The provision continued the requirements that fathers had
to have been resident in the United States and that no person proscribed
by a state could be admitted absent the consent of the relevant state
legislature.394 But, a new condition was added barring any person “who
has been legally convicted of having joined the army of Great Britain
during the late war.”395 This last provision echoed the 1730 English
statute’s exclusion of the children of fathers who had served in the
armies of foreign enemies from natural born subject status.396
The 1795 statute’s formulation grouped together as U.S. citizens the
children of naturalized citizens living within the United States who were
less than twenty-one years old with the children of U.S. citizens born
abroad, whom the 1790 statute had declared to be “natural born citizens.”
But, the children in the former group were not necessarily “natural
born citizens” by operation of jus soli because they might have been
born abroad like their naturalized parents. The 1790 statute, by
contrast, had distinguished the children of naturalized citizens who
became U.S. citizens through derivative citizenship as minors. Thus,
when St. George Tucker observed that “Persons naturalized according
to these acts [of 1790 and 1795], are entitled to all the rights of naturalborn citizens, except . . . they are forever incapable of being chosen to the
office of president of the United States,”397 he was referring to these children
of naturalized citizens, not the children of U.S. citizens born “beyond sea”
who had been deemed “natural born citizens” by the 1790 Act.
It bears remembering that the 1790 U.S. statute and its successors
were naturalization statutes defining who does—and does not—have to
follow legislated naturalization procedures (oaths, residence

392. Compare An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3, 1 Stat.
104 (1790), with ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414.
393. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 415.
394. See id.
395. Id.
396. See The British Nationality Act 1730, 4 Geo. 2 c. 21, § 1 (Eng.).
397. See TUCKER, supra note 314, at 374 n.12.
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requirements) to be a U.S. citizen.398 Under the statutes, children born
abroad to U.S. citizen fathers who previously resided in the United
States, “natural born citizens,” did not have to follow these procedures.
The 1790 statute explicitly used the words “natural born citizens” to
designate this category of extraterritorially born citizens.399 The 1795
statute that repealed it referred to them as simply “citizens of the
United States,” lumping them together with children within the
United States who obtained derivative citizenship when their parents
naturalized.400 But, there was no shift in purposes from 1790 to 1795,
that is, to revise the set of persons eligible to be President. In fact, none
of the statutes were designed to address eligibility to be President or
even a member of Congress. From the fourteenth to eighteenth
centuries, the key legal benefit of being deemed “natural born” under
the English statutes and the 1790 U.S. statute was the right to hold
property, and, as corollary, to inherit—rights denied to aliens at the
time.401 Furthermore, the ambiguity in the 1790 statute about whether
a foreign-born child had to have both parents be U.S. citizens, just the
father be a U.S. citizen, or either parent be a U.S. citizen, is resolved
in favor of just the father when one considers the context of the
residency requirement for the father and the English statutory
precedents, namely the 1730 statute.
One important feature of this account is the sexism implicit in the
original meaning of the Natural Born Citizen Clause, something that
other scholarship has not emphasized. We forget today how sexist
American and European society was in the late eighteenth century. As
the doctrine of coverture demonstrates, the conventional wisdom of
the time was that women were not made to have active political lives
independent of their husbands.402 When viewed in the broader
398. See Neuman, supra note 388, at 253 (discussing ideological qualifications
necessary for citizenship under the statutes).
399. An Act to Establish a Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 104 (1790).
400. See ch. 20, 1 Stat. 415.
401. Another benefit of subject or citizen status in the nineteenth century age of
imperialism was the right to have one’s country use armed force to protect the bodily
and property interests of nationals. An expansive definition of who counted as a
country’s national was a frequent pretext for war during this period. See Thomas H.
Lee, The Law of War and the Responsibility to Protect Civilians: A Reinterpretation, 55 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 251, 266 (2014) (noting how “injury or the threat of injury to a citizen” was
a frequent cause of war).
402. See Claudia Zaher, When a Woman’s Marital Status Determined Her Legal Status: A
Research Guide on the Common Law Doctrine of Coverture, 94 BRITISH. L. LIB. J. 459, 461–62
(2014) (explaining the legal non-recognition of women under the doctrine of coverture).
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context of these contemporaneous social norms, it becomes evident
that jus sanguinis did not operate by matrilineal descent when parents
differed in citizenship or subjectship (a much rarer combination than
now). A child took the nationality of the father, not the mother. The
idea was so deeply embedded that it did not need to be spoken or
written about—it was an omnipresent presumption.
It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that the notion that
nationality could pass through the mother began to take root, in large
part because of historical political developments, similar to the
evolution of earlier English “natural born subject” statutes. Great
Britain, under Queen Victoria in 1844, was the first European nation
to enact a statute extending natural born subject status to the lawful
children of Englishwomen born outside of her majesty’s dominions.403
The statute was enacted under a Queen at a time when the British
Empire was greatly expanding. In medieval times, the primary reason
for extending jus sanguinis to the foreign-born children of public
servants or English merchants was domestic: to protect these
children’s inheritance and property rights in England.404 In the
eighteenth century, mercantilism supplied a new justification for
growing the numbers of British subjects. But, by the mid-nineteenth
century, there was another important international reason for
expanding the numbers of British nationals. The primary justification
for the use of armed force in international affairs during the midnineteenth to early twentieth centuries was the protection of the
property and persons of a country’s nationals abroad.405 By increasing
the numbers of those who might claim British nationality, the British
Empire increased its ability to claim lawful grounds to use force.
The U.S. Congress rejected the model of British Parliament’s 1844
extension of jus sanguinis to matrilineal descent for extraterritorial
births under Queen Victoria. American progressives subsequently
proposed a similar bill, but Congress not only failed to enact it, it
passed a statute in 1855 prohibiting U.S. citizenship to children born

403. See H.S.Q. HENRIQUES, THE LAW OF ALIENS AND NATURALIZATION 5–6 (1906)
(explaining how the U.K. Naturalization Act of 1844 expanded women’s ability to
confer British nationality upon spouses and children).
404. See Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal
Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 2137, 2140 (2014)
(discussing jus sanguinis citizenship in the context of family structure and preservation
of rights for legitimate children of U.S. citizens).
405. See Lee, supra note 401, at 266.

406

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:327

outside the United States to U.S. citizen mothers.406 In fact, it was not
until 1934 that Congress enacted a law declaring children born abroad
to U.S. citizen mothers who had resided in the United States to be
citizens if they entered the United States before age eighteen and lived
there for five years.407 This was several decades after the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868,
and fourteen years after the Nineteenth Amendment granted women
suffrage in 1920.408 This chronology indicates that the Equal
Protection Clause was not viewed as implicated by the differing
citizenship treatment of foreign-born children of U.S. fathers as
opposed to mothers until the mid-twentieth century,409 long after
American jurists had abandoned natural law as a direct source of
jurisprudence regarding citizenship.
The Fourteenth Amendment also provides: “All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside.”410 This provision does not address the requirement of being a
“natural born Citizen” to be eligible to be President, or, for that matter,
eligibility for any high national office. Instead, it articulates a nondiscrimination principle among persons who are “born or naturalized
in the United States” and subject to its jurisdiction with respect to their
U.S. and state citizenship.411 By its express terms, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Citizenship Clause does not address persons “born or
naturalized” outside the United States. The U.S. Supreme Court, in
Wong Kim Ark v. United States,412 interpreted this provision to mean that
a person born in U.S. territory to Chinese parents was a U.S. citizen,

406. See An Act to Secure the Right of Citizenship to Children of Citizens of the
United States Born Out of the Limits Thereof, ch. 71, 10 Stat. 604 (1855). The rule of
patrilineal descent was reaffirmed twice, in 1907 and 1926. See An Act in Reference to
the Expatriation of Citizens and Their Protection Abroad, ch. 2535, Pub. L. No. 59193, 34 Stat. 1228 (1907) and 8 U.S.C. § 6 (1926).
407. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163 (1952); Equal
Nationality Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 250, ch. 344, 48 Stat. 797, modified by The Equal
Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 853, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (effective Jan. 13, 1941).
See generally Lester B. Orfield, The Citizenship Act of 1934, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 99–100
(1934) (discussing the passage of the Citizenship Act of 1934).
408. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
409. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693–94 (2017); Nguyen v.
INS, 533 U.S. 53, 58–59 (2001); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 426 (1998).
410. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
411. Id.
412. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
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regardless of the parent’s presumptive allegiance to the Chinese
emperor.413 The Court, in its opinion, embraced the principle of jus
soli as a constitutional birthright principle and rejected the idea that
jus sanguinis trumped it as to the child of private Chinese subjects born
on American soil.414 However, it had no occasion to decide upon the
application of jus sanguinis to the U.S. citizenship of children born of
American parents abroad.
*

*

*

To sum up Parts II through IV, the two natural law birthright
principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis co-existed in the early modern
European legal order, although jus soli had deeper roots in England,
an island nation, and jus sanguinis was dominant on the European
continent. But, both jurisdictions recognized that jus sanguinis
operated vis-à-vis children born to public servants or private fathers
abroad. Jurisprudentially speaking, the rule that jus sanguinis applied
extraterritorially was English common law and the law of nations—
both in turn were instantiations of natural law. This understanding
was affirmed by the greatest English and American legal treatise writers
of the late eighteenth century, William Blackstone and James Kent,
respectively. A close reading of the First Congress’s Naturalization Act
of 1790 also confirms this original understanding and the extent to
which early Americans were aware of the landmark 1350 statute De
Natis Ultra Mare, the earliest English legal manifestation of jus sanguinis
as applied to the children of English subjects born beyond the sea.
Nor does a 1784 Maryland Statute making Lafayette and “his male
heirs forever” lead to the conclusion that early Americans believed that
legislatures could bestow natural born citizen status on any person with
a connection to the United States, even foreigners. The provision in
Article II of the Constitution making any citizen at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution eligible for the President took care of any
foreigner worthy of being deemed eligible for the President by having
participated in founding the country. Thus, the Maryland statute
manifested a one-time historical exception, not a precedent for
plenary congressional power to determine who is a “natural born
Citizen” eligible to be President. The one area of discretion Congress
did have pertaining to natural born citizen status was setting a

413. Id. at 693.
414. Id. at 731–32.
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residency requirement on the U.S. citizen father from whom a foreignborn child derived U.S. citizenship.
Finally, no after-enacted constitutional provision addresses or
modifies Article II’s requirement that a person must be a “natural born
Citizen” to be eligible to be President. Nor has the Supreme Court
decided a case regarding the meaning of the Natural Born Citizen
Clause or whether any after-enacted amendments like the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause has altered the Article II
conditions for presidential eligibility. Consequently, the original
meaning of that provision when it was adopted between 1787 and 1789
remains an important and unanswered question of constitutional
interpretation.
CONCLUSION
Article II of the U.S. Constitution requires a President to be a
“natural born Citizen.” But, as the Supreme Court once observed:
“The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born
citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that.”415 The words
appear not to have been used in any law in the United States for the
past two centuries, and have not been used in any U.S. national law
since 1790. To date, no one has offered a clear and persuasive account
of the phrase’s original meaning.
Original meanings are rarely ascertainable, but this case is a rare
exception. The relevant historical evidence, which was exhaustively
reviewed in this Article—Constitutional Convention debates, English
common law, natural law, law of nations, canonical Anglo-American
treatises like Blackstone’s and Kent’s, the 1784 Maryland Lafayette
statute, the 1790 U.S. Naturalization Statute—all lead to the
conclusion that the original meaning of “natural born Citizen” in
Article II refers to a person either born in the United States, or outside
it to a parent in government service or to a U.S. citizen father. This
answer is faithful to then-universal natural law principles of jus soli and
jus sanguinis, and to the material condition of the early United States
as a new nation geographically distant from Europe but dependent on
it for trade and commerce.
What should we do with this original meaning today, when no one
believes in natural law principles of “born” citizenship and has not for
a long time? I venture only preliminary thoughts here. Any attempt

415. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 167 (1874).
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to translate the original meaning to present-day reality is stymied by
the fact that the anchor concept is now extinct. To underscore the
point, imagine that Article II had limited presidential eligibility to “a
citizen under ancient Roman republican principles” instead. (The
possibility is not as outrageous as it may seem, given the framing
generation’s deep respect for the ancient Roman republic and its
institutions—e.g., the Senate and the Consulship, which was an
inspiration for the Presidency itself.) This hypothetical provision
would more transparently require us to analyze a candidate’s eligibility
under extinct historical standards. Modern constitutionalists might
very well decide to ignore such an anachronistic condition altogether
despite its plain-language clarity, or strongly urge a constitutional
amendment. Others more favorably disposed to original meanings
might insist on the necessity of historical research to figure out who
counted as a citizen under ancient Roman republican principles, and
on enforcing the fruits of the research as a requirement on presidential
eligibility today. The more elusive historicity of Article II’s “natural
born Citizen” requirement, however, has sparked neither politically
prominent demands to abolish or amend it, nor a more coherent
conception of what implementing the original meaning entails.
My findings on the original meaning of the Natural Born Citizen
Clause reveal that it was not grounded exclusively on jus soli or jus
sanguinis, but rather incorporated both natural law principles. This
realization has important implications for modern applications. For
instance, a strict adherence to jus soli might compel the conclusion that
a person born in the United States of foreign parents within the
country on a temporary but non-diplomatic status such as students or
in violation of U.S. immigration laws, would be a natural born citizen
eligible to be President of the United States. But an understanding
that the concept of “natural born Citizen’ in Article II also
encompassed jus sanguinis throws doubt on sole reliance on jus soli to
determine who is eligible to be President. On the other hand, relying
exclusively on jus sanguinis might lead one to conclude that a person
born abroad to a U.S. citizen father himself born overseas to a U.S.
citizen father might count as a “natural born Citizen.” But the adopters of
the Constitution did not eschew connection to U.S. soil altogether, for
instance, by enacting statutes requiring the citizen father’s residence
in the United States, like the 1790 Naturalization Act.
From a present-day perspective, the greatest misgivings about
implementing the original meaning of the Natural Born Citizen Clause
arise from the blatant sexism of the natural law principle of jus
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sanguinis. Even in the twentieth century when natural law had receded
as a wellspring of citizenship jurisprudence and long after the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause had been adopted,
American laws proceeded on the assumption that children inherited
the citizenship status of their fathers, not their mothers. Indeed, in
many states, courts hewed to the view that married women (not just
children) acquired the citizenship or domicile status of their husbands
well into the twentieth century. But those sexist doctrines and laws
have been retired for decades now.
On the other hand, it is difficult to see how Article II’s “natural born
Citizen” requirement violates any other provision of the Constitution
by limiting presidential eligibility to children born abroad of U.S.
citizen fathers but not mothers, unless the mother is in government
service. No one has a right to be President of the United States, and
so denial of presidential eligibility is not like denial of the right to vote
or to equal treatment in schools or in the general workplace.
Moreover, it is of no consequence whether the child of a U.S. citizen
father born abroad is a male or a female: the jus sanguinis prong of
the “natural born Citizen” requirement operates at the level of the
parent, not the child. And the Supreme Court’s decisions on the
citizenship status of children born abroad to U.S. citizens abroad have
not focused at all on Article II presidential eligibility; nor are they
directly relevant, with the exception of Sessions v. Morales-Santana,416
which commands the same prior residence requirement for citizen
fathers as citizen mothers to children born abroad.
Given these considerations, what the courts should do with the
natural-law original meaning of the Natural Born Citizen Clause—e.g.,
whether to stick by it or to hold it outdated by present realities of
gender and globalism—in cases before them is beyond the scope of
the Article. Indeed, some courts have held the Clause to be nonjusticiable,417 but, as one state judge has concluded,418 that view seems
misguided since the question is one of constitutional interpretation

416. See text accompanying notes 379–81.
417. See Keyes v. Bowen, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 207, 215–16 (Ct. App. 2010); Berg v.
Obama, 574 F. Supp. 2d 509, 518 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (“The alleged harm to voters
stemming from a presidential candidate’s failure to satisfy the eligibility requirements
of the Natural Born Citizen Clause is not concrete or particularized enough to
constitute an injury in fact sufficient to satisfy Article III standing.”), aff’d, 586 F.3d 234
(3d Cir. 2009).
418. See Williams v. Cruz, OAL DKT. NO. STE 5016-16, 2016 WL 1554252, at *17
(N.J. Admin. Apr. 12, 2016).
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that does not trespass on the constitutional powers of the political
branches. The aim of this Article, rather, has been to present all the
historical evidence and analyze it in an even-handed way. One very
strong impression I have formed from the exercise is the startling
contingency of this enigmatic constitutional provision. If John Jay had
never written his two-sentence note to Washington in late July 1787,
the original draft would likely have prevailed, and any U.S. citizen who
had been an inhabitant of the United States for twenty-one years would
have been eligible to be President. At least for me, this contingency
raises doubt whether commitment to our Constitution requires blind
fidelity to every single word in its text. Words, after all, are only as
perfect as their creators, and so is our written Constitution.

